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LIFE  IN  THE  SWEATBOX
Pamela Foohey, Robert M. Lawless, Katherine Porter & Deborah Thorne*
The time before a person files bankruptcy is sometimes called the financial “sweatbox.”
Using original data from the Consumer Bankruptcy Project, we find that people are living longer
in the sweatbox before filing bankruptcy than they have in the past.  We also describe the deple-
tion of wealth and well-being that defines people’s time in the sweatbox.  For those people who
struggle for more than two years before filing bankruptcy—the “long strugglers”—their time in
the sweatbox is particularly damaging.  During their years in the sweatbox, long strugglers deal
with persistent collection calls, go without healthcare, food, and utilities, lose homes and other
property, and yet remain ashamed of needing to file.  For these people in particular, though time
in the sweatbox undermines their ability to realize bankruptcy’s “fresh start,” they do not file until
long after the costs outweigh the benefits.  This Article’s findings challenge longstanding narra-
tives about who files bankruptcy and why.  These narratives underlie our laws, influence how
judges rule in individual cases, and affect how attorneys interact with their clients.
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INTRODUCTION
The time before a person files bankruptcy is sometimes called the finan-
cial “sweatbox.”1  People in the financial sweatbox are on the brink of
defaulting on their debts, which is when their lenders can charge high inter-
est rates and fees and otherwise profit from their customers’ financial mis-
ery.2  Although the term “sweatbox” often is connected with bankruptcy, how
long people spend in the sweatbox before filing and what it means to live in
the sweatbox has yet to be carefully examined.  Understanding what people
endure while in the sweatbox is crucial to evaluating the longstanding belief
that people decide to file bankruptcy based on a strategic, financial calcula-
tion.  This unverified narrative about people’s filing decisions underlies our
bankruptcy laws and influences how the legal system operates in practice,
including whether people actually can obtain the beneficial “fresh start”
bankruptcy promises.
Using original data from the Consumer Bankruptcy Project (CBP),3 we
find that people are living longer in the sweatbox before filing bankruptcy
than they have in the past, and describe the depletion of wealth and well-
being that defines people’s time in the sweatbox.  Today, two-thirds of people
who file bankruptcy report that they seriously struggled with their debts for
more than two years prior to bankruptcy.4  Almost one-third report that they
1 Jay Westbrook is credited with coining the term “sweatbox” to describe “the business
model of squeezing a few years of fees out of debtors before financial default.”  John A. E.
Pottow, Private Liability for Reckless Consumer Lending, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 405, 416. Ronald
Mann linked the term specifically with credit card lending.  Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy
Reform and the “Sweat Box” of Credit Card Debt, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 375, 391; see also Katherine
Porter, Bankrupt Profits: The Credit Industry’s Business Model for Postbankruptcy Lending, 93
IOWA L. REV. 1369, 1399 (2008) [hereinafter Porter, Bankrupt Profits] (describing families
that are “slow to pay” as “ideal customers for lenders’ ‘sweatboxes’”).
2 See Mann, supra note 1, at 385–87, 391 (defining the sweatbox).  The sweatbox also
includes people who have defaulted on their debts, which typically occurs after they have
spent time trying to keep up with monthly payments plus added fees and additional inter-
est. Id. at 386–87 (“The question for the lender is how long the borrower will remain in
the unstable position [of amount outstanding continuing to grow] before failure occurs.”).
3 The Consumer Bankruptcy Project (CBP) is a multiresearcher effort that investi-
gates the people who file bankruptcy.  The CBP’s current iteration includes people who
filed bankruptcy between 2013 and 2016.  For details about the CBP, see infra Part II.
4 See infra Section III.A.
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seriously struggled for more than five years, double the frequency from the
CBP’s survey of people who filed bankruptcy in 2007.5
For those people who struggle for more than two years before filing
bankruptcy—the “long strugglers”—their time in the sweatbox is particularly
damaging, distinguishing them from other debtors.  They lose their homes to
foreclosure, sell other property, report going without food and other necessi-
ties, all while employing multiple tactics to try to make ends meet and deal-
ing with persistent debt collection calls and lawsuits.  When long strugglers
finally file, they enter bankruptcy with fewer assets than other debtors and
overwhelming unsecured debts.6
Long strugglers would have benefitted financially from filing months or
years before they did.  Yet seven out of ten long strugglers say they felt shame
upon filing bankruptcy.7  These debtors’ reports about their prebankruptcy
lives suggest a model of deciding to file based on something beyond just dol-
lars and cents.  This reality contrasts starkly with an enduring narrative about
people’s use of bankruptcy as a calculated, knowledgeable decision, as evi-
denced most clearly by debates surrounding the most recent overhaul of
bankruptcy laws.
The term “financial sweatbox” came out of the debates leading to the
2005 passage of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act (BAPCPA),8 a major amendment to the Bankruptcy Code designed to
decrease consumer bankruptcy filings by making filing more difficult, expen-
sive, and time-consuming.9  The consumer credit industry insisted that
changes to bankruptcy were needed because bankruptcy courts were full of
deadbeat, “can-pay” debtors who filed “bankruptcies of convenience” to try to
escape their rightful obligations and who felt no shame in “abusing” the sys-
tem.10  This story contradicted the overwhelming expert consensus that the
bankruptcy system functioned well, abuse was rare, and there was no need for
drastic overhaul.11  Academic articles posited that the consumer credit indus-
5 See infra Section III.A.
6 See infra Sections III.C–E.
7 See infra Section III.G.
8 Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered titles of the
U.S. Code).  The law’s effective date was October 17, 2005. Id. § 1406(a), 119 Stat. at 215.
9 See Angela Littwin, Adapting to BAPCPA, 90 AM. BANKR. L.J. 183, 183–87 (2016)
(overviewing BAPCPA’s changes to the Bankruptcy Code that “appeared likely to impair
the consumer bankruptcy system’s ability to function”); Lois R. Lupica, The Consumer Bank-
ruptcy Fee Study: Final Report, 20 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 17, 27 (2012) (noting BAPCPA’s
goals); Mann, supra note 1, at 377 (listing BAPCPA’s changes to the Code); infra Part I.
10 Mann, supra note 1, at 376–77 (discussing debates about the 2005 amendments to
bankruptcy laws); see also Porter, Bankrupt Profits, supra note 1, at 1371–72 (overviewing the
“strategic behavior” model of bankruptcy).
11 See Porter, Bankrupt Profits, supra note 1, at 1371–72 (discussing empirical evidence
that contradicted the “strategic behavior” model of bankruptcy); Elizabeth Warren, A Prin-
cipled Approach to Consumer Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 483, 493 (1997) [hereinafter
Warren, Principled Approach] (“[T]here are no data showing that the consumer bankruptcy
system is shot through with abuse.  Indeed, most data, including the consumer credit
industry’s own studies, show that the system is generally used by American families in des-
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try lobbied for BAPCPA to prolong the time consumers spend on the brink
of financial default when lenders make the most money—that is, the time
people spend in the sweatbox.12
Although the financial sweatbox existed long before it was termed as
such, BAPCPA brought it to the forefront of discussions about consumer
credit policies and bankruptcy.  The sweatbox metaphor quickly became pop-
ular in commentary both about BAPCPA’s effect13 and about the conse-
quences of the consumer lending business model generally.14  For instance,
perate financial circumstances.”); Letter from ninety-two law professors, to Arlen Specter,
U.S. Senator & Patrick Leahy, U.S. Senator (Feb. 16. 2005) (critiquing BAPCPA), reprinted
in Charles J. Tabb, Consumer Bankruptcy After the Fall: United States Law Under S. 256, 43
CANADIAN BUS. L.J. 28, 70–75 (2006).
12 See, e.g., Mann, supra note 1, at 389–92 (linking this lending model to BAPCPA);
Porter, Bankrupt Profits, supra note 1, at 1372 (noting that during debates about BAPCPA,
“the credit industry’s lending decisions were not subjected to the same scrutiny as debtors’
borrowing decisions”); Pottow, supra note 1, at 407–08 (arguing that bankruptcy reforms
should have been targeted, in part, to those creditors who are responsible for debtors’
defaults).
13 See Jean Braucher, A Guide to Interpretation of the 2005 Bankruptcy Law, 16 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 349, 353 (2008) (stating that BAPCPA’s result “is that more of the over-
indebted remain in the ‘sweat box of consumer credit’ for longer”); Linda Coco, Debtor’s
Prison in the Neoliberal State: “Debtfare” and the Cultural Logics of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention
and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 49 CAL. W. L. REV. 1, 3–5 (2012) (overviewing
BAPCPA’s effects on bankruptcy filings); Giacomo Rojas Elgueta, The Paradoxical Bank-
ruptcy Discharge: Rereading the Common Law–Civil Law Relationship, 19 FORDHAM J. CORP. &
FIN. L. 293, 331 (2014) (stating that it “appears” that BAPCPA was designed to prolong
debtors’ time in the sweatbox); Andrea Freeman, Payback: A Structural Analysis of the Credit
Card Problem, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 151, 153 (2013) (discussing the subprime credit card market
and bankruptcy); Robert M. Lawless, Angela K. Littwin, Katherine M. Porter, John A. E.
Pottow, Deborah K. Thorne & Elizabeth Warren, Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail? An Empirical
Study of Consumer Debtors, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 349, 353 (2008) (noting that data from the
2007 Consumer Bankruptcy Project support the “sweat box” theory); Angela Littwin, The
Affordability Paradox: How Consumer Bankruptcy’s Greatest Weakness May Account for Its Surpris-
ing Success, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1933, 1936 (2011) (linking the sweatbox to BAPCPA’s
goals); Andrew P. MacArthur, Pay to Play: The Poor’s Problems in the BAPCPA, 25 EMORY
BANKR. DEV. J. 407, 409–11 (2009) (discussing BAPCPA’s effect on the poor’s access to
bankruptcy); Michael Simkovic, The Effect of BAPCPA on Credit Card Industry Profits and
Prices, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 1–2 (2009) (investigating credit card profits post-BAPCPA);
Derek S. Witte, The Bear Hug That Is Crushing Debt-Burdened Americans: Why Overzealous Regu-
lation of the Debt-Settlement Industry Ultimately Harms the Consumers It Means to Protect, 14 TEX.
REV. L. & POL. 277, 278 (2010) (linking bankruptcy, debt settlement, and the sweatbox).
14 See Oren Bar-Gill, Exchange, The Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN.
L. REV. 749, 784–86 (2008) (relying on the sweatbox metaphor to discuss one theory of
credit card issuers’ business model); Jean Braucher, Form and Substance in Consumer Finan-
cial Protection, 7 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 107, 120–21 (2012) (discussing the sweat-
box in the context of consumer lending); Cassandra Jones Havard, “Goin’ Round in
Circles” . . . and Letting the Bad Loans Win: When Subprime Lending Fails Borrowers: The Need for
Uniform Broker Regulation, 86 NEB. L. REV. 737, 760–62 (2008) (linking the sweatbox to
subprime home loans); Iain Ramsay, ‘To Heap Distress Upon Distress?’ Comparative Reflections
on Interest-Rate Ceilings, 60 U. TORONTO L.J. 707, 716–17 (2010) (discussing the “‘sweatbox’
model of lending” as it applies to consumer lending in the United Kingdom); Amy J.
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the passage of the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure
Act of 2009 (“CARD Act”),15 which limits how credit card companies can
charge consumers, highlighted credit card lending’s sweatbox.16  The CARD
Act ameliorated some of the effects of this part of the financial sweatbox,17
saving American consumers $11.9 billion a year without reducing access to
credit or increasing interest rates charged by lenders.18
Credit cards are but one corner of the sweatbox, and even after the
CARD Act’s enactment, financial distress undoubtedly remains a devastating
experience.  What our data show about the hardships that long struggling
debtors in particular endure before filing paints a grim picture of life in the
sweatbox.  The sweatbox’s severe financial and emotional drain makes our
finding about the increase in how long people struggle to pay their debts
prior to filing bankruptcy particularly noteworthy, especially in light of few
other measurable changes in the financial and demographic profile of peo-
ple who file.19  That people sacrifice increasingly more as they spend a
longer time in the sweatbox, depleting assets key to building their postban-
kruptcy lives, also may make their ability to achieve bankruptcy’s “fresh start”
and get back on their feet even more tenuous.20
Schmitz, Remedy Realities in Business-to-Consumer Contracting, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 213, 241 (2016)
(extending the sweatbox metaphor to consumer dispute resolution, such as the arbitration
clauses that are included in many consumer contracts).
15 Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12,
15, 16, and 31 U.S.C.).
16 Sumit Agarwal, Souphala Chomsisengphet, Neale Mahoney & Johannes Stroebel,
Regulating Consumer Financial Products: Evidence From Credit Cards, 130 Q.J. ECON. 111,
112–15 (2015) (overviewing the CARD Act); Oren Bar-Gill & Ryan Bubb, Credit Card Pric-
ing: The CARD Act and Beyond, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 967, 974–75 (2012) (overviewing the
CARD Act and explaining that it “restricts issuers’ ability to raise interest rates and impose
penalty fees”).
17 See Bar-Gill & Bubb, supra note 16, at 973 (noting what common credit card lending
terms the CARD Act has not substantially affected); Eboni S. Nelson, From the Schoolhouse to
the Poorhouse: The Credit CARD Act’s Failure to Adequately Protect Young Consumers, 56 VILL. L.
REV. 1, 4–7 (2011) (summarizing the CARD Act and arguing that it does not sufficiently
protect younger consumers).
18 Agarwal et al., supra note 16, at 114; see also CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, THE
CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET 10 (2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201512_
cfpb_report-the-consumer-credit-card-market.pdf (finding that the CARD Act helped con-
sumers avoid more than $16 billion in “gotcha” credit card fees over four years).
19 The data confirm that families continue to arrive in bankruptcy reeling from job
loss, medical expenses, and divorce; drowning in debt; and representing a cross section of
the American middle class. See TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE
WESTBROOK, THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT 243 (2000) (identifying job
loss, medical expenses, and divorce as the leading triggering causes of bankruptcy filings);
Elizabeth Warren & Deborah Thorne, A Vulnerable Middle Class: Bankruptcy and Class Status,
in BROKE: HOW DEBT BANKRUPTS THE MIDDLE CLASS 25, 25 (Katherine Porter ed., 2012)
(noting that consumer bankruptcy largely is a middle-class phenomenon); infra Part III.
20 See generally Katherine Porter & Deborah Thorne, The Failure of Bankruptcy’s Fresh
Start, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 67 (2006) (exploring whether bankruptcy offers families a better
financial future); infra Part V.  “Fresh start” comes from Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S.
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The narratives told about when and why people file bankruptcy influ-
ence the legislative details of the Bankruptcy Code, how bankruptcy judges
rule in individual cases, how attorneys interact with their clients, and con-
sumer financial laws generally.21  Without data, the polity will construct these
narratives around anecdotes that not only might be false, but also may rest on
cultural stereotypes.22  To make evidence-based decisions about bankruptcy
and consumer credit laws, we need to understand how people experience
these systems.  In describing the lengths that people who file bankruptcy go
to pay their debts, this Article’s results challenge enduring beliefs about peo-
ple’s bankruptcy filing decision-making process, will provide judges with data
to make decisions that reflect reality, and should influence debates about
changes to consumer credit policies and bankruptcy for years to come.23
Part I of this Article overviews consumer bankruptcy, including the
debates surrounding BAPCPA’s passage that highlight the prevailing narra-
tive about how people decide to file bankruptcy.  In Part II, we summarize
our methodology.  Part III presents our findings about life in the sweatbox,
focusing on those people who report struggling with their debts for more
than two years before filing.
Why do people report spending longer in the sweatbox before filing
bankruptcy?  As detailed in Part IV, our data cannot answer that question
directly, but the data suggest one primary explanation.  As compared with
other debtors, long strugglers were much more likely to cite pressure from
debt collectors as ultimately leading them to bankruptcy.  Half of long strug-
234, 244 (1934) (“One of the primary purposes of the bankruptcy act is to ‘relieve the
honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start afresh
free from the obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes.’”
(quoting Williams v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554–55 (1915))).
21 See Braucher, supra note 14, at 120–21 (discussing consumer lending); Adam Levi-
tin, Rosemary Gambardella & Mark S. Scarberry, Abusive Credit Card Practices and Bank-
ruptcy: Three ABI Members Testify Before Senate Judiciary Subcommittee, AM. BANKR. INST. J., May
2009, at 10 (reviewing testimony about a Senate bill designed to “encourage safer and
sounder consumer lending by discouraging lenders from making loans that they cannot
reasonably expect consumers to repay, including ‘sweatbox’ lending models”).
22 Studies about the racial demographics of bankruptcy are one example of how narra-
tives based on stereotypes can influence the bankruptcy system. See Jean Braucher, Dov
Cohen & Robert M. Lawless, Race, Attorney Influence, and Bankruptcy Chapter Choice, 9 J.
EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 393, 393 (2012) (finding that African American households are more
likely than other similar households to file chapter 13 rather than chapter 7, and linking
the disparity to attorneys); A. Mechele Dickerson, Racial Steering in Bankruptcy, 20 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 623, 623 (2012) (discussing Race, Attorney Influence, and Bankruptcy
Chapter Choice and responding to alternatives offered to explain the results as themselves
being based on cultural stereotypes).
23 The American Bankruptcy Institute recently formed a Commission on Consumer
Bankruptcy. The ABI Commission on Consumer Bankruptcy, AM. BANKR. INST., https://con-
sumercommission.abi.org/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2018).  One of this Article’s authors is the
Commission’s Reporter.  The Commission’s formation and charge to broadly reconsider
consumer bankruptcy laws make the data in this Article especially timely.
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glers also had a collection lawsuit filed against them prior to bankruptcy.24
Long strugglers’ reports of collection pressures coincide with changes in debt
collection and debt buying.25  In prior decades, falling behind on debts
meant being unable to pay businesses and people who were part of a debtor’s
daily life.  Now, collection calls increasingly come from a handful of market-
dominant lenders or unknown entities that purchased the delinquent debt
from the original creditor or another debt buyer.26  In addition, changes in
information technology should have made it economical to pursue legal rem-
edies for small-dollar debts that a generation ago might have gone
uncollected.27
In a world of escalating collection tactics, some people who previously
may have sweated it out and never filed bankruptcy may now decide to file.
For others, changes in debt collection may lead them to conceptualize their
money troubles as legal problems addressable by bankruptcy, also bringing
them into the bankruptcy system.28  Combined, which households file bank-
ruptcy may have fundamentally shifted, and with it, debtors’ reports of how
long they struggle prior to filing.
Regardless of the reasons, people report waiting longer to file bank-
ruptcy.  Contrary to assertions that people file “bankruptc[ies] of conve-
nience,”29 our data establish that most debtors resort to bankruptcy as a last-
24 See infra Section III.C.
25 See Dalie´ Jime´nez, Dirty Debts Sold Dirt Cheap, 52 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 41, 49–55, 92
(2015) (overviewing debt buying and collection, and noting how they changed postreces-
sion when delinquent debts flooded the market); Neil L. Sobol, Protecting Consumers From
Zombie-Debt Collectors, 44 N.M. L. REV. 327, 334–36 (2014) (chronicling the development of
these industries); infra Part IV.
26 See John S. Kiernan, Paying Debt in Collections: When to Do It, How to Pay & Expert Tips,
WALLETHUB (June 3, 2014), https://wallethub.com/edu/debt-collections-guide/25818/
(noting that debt usually is turned over to collectors after months of nonpayment despite
collection attempts).
27 See Paul Kiel & Annie Waldman, The Color of Debt: How Collection Suits Squeeze Black
Neighborhoods, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 8, 2015), https://www.propublica.org/article/debt-collec-
tion-lawsuits-squeeze-black-neighborhoods (discussing “a little-known but pervasive shift in
the way debt is collected in America: Companies now routinely use the courts to pursue
millions of people over even small consumer debts”); infra note 130.
28 As explained infra Part IV, although the characteristics of people who file bank-
ruptcy have remained unchanged, see supra note 19, changes in debt collection may have
pushed certain households with these same characteristics to file bankruptcy that would
not have done so in prior years.  Our results thus engage with broader inquiries into how
people conceptualize “justiciable events” in their lives as addressable by law. See Pamela
Foohey, When Faith Falls Short: Bankruptcy Decisions of Churches, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1319,
1324–36 (2015) (overviewing research regarding “how people understand the relevance of
law to problems in their life”).  For other explanations for why people are spending longer
in the sweatbox, see Section III.B and Part IV.
29 Supra note 10.  Popular conceptions of people’s use of the bankruptcy system also
remain misleading, as evident in the abundance of bankruptcy attorney websites that
include pages devoted to dispelling myths about why people file bankruptcy. See, e.g., Rob-
ert Brandt, Why People Declare Bankruptcy?, LAW FIRM ROBERT S. BRANDT (Dec. 28, 2010),
http://www. brandtlawfirm.com/bankruptcy/why-people-declare-bankruptcy/; Randall R.
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ditch measure and are ashamed of filing.  In Part V, we develop the implica-
tions of people’s lengthy struggles and financial misery for their lives before,
during, and after bankruptcy.  Understanding the reality of the people who
appear in bankruptcy courts is essential to the functioning of the bankruptcy
system and to its reform—as well as to the enactment of effective consumer
credit laws and policies.  We conclude by emphasizing the importance of evi-
dence-based decisions and policies going forward to transform bankruptcy
once again into a system that helps people get back on their feet.
I. CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Filing Bankruptcy
The debtor initiates almost every consumer bankruptcy case in the
United States.  The debtor’s filing of the petition with the bankruptcy court
creates the estate and activates the automatic stay.30  The automatic stay halts
most actions that would adversely affect the debtor’s financial interests, such
as ongoing wage garnishments and foreclosure sales.  It also prevents collec-
tion attempts, such as calling people at their homes or repossessing their
property.31
People who file bankruptcy essentially have two options: chapter 7 or
chapter 13.32  The two chapters are distinct in terms of length, cost, and to
some extent, the ability to keep property,33 but for most debtors, the end
goal of each is the discharge of debts.  Chapter 7 is often referred to as a
liquidation bankruptcy.34  In exchange for turning over all nonexempt
assets, which are sold by a bankruptcy trustee for the benefit of creditors, the
debtor receives a discharge.35  More than 95% of debtors who file chapter 7
Saxton, Why Do People File for Bankruptcy Relief?, SAXTON L., PLLC (July 1, 2017), https://
saxton.law/why-do-people-file-for-bankruptcy-relief/; Why Do People File For Bankruptcy?,
WALKER & WALKER L. OFFS., PLLC (Mar. 30, 2016), http://www.bankruptcytruth.com/why-
file-bankruptcy.html.
30 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a), 541 (2012).
31 Id. § 362(a).
32 People also may file under chapter 11, which provides for reorganization of debts
and is typically used by artificial entities.  Chapter 11 cases accounted for 0.15% of all
nonbusiness cases filed in 2016. Table F-2, U.S. Bankruptcy Courts—Business and Nonbusiness
Cases Commenced, by Chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, During the 12-Month Period Ending December
31, 2016, ADMIN. OFFICE U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_ta
bles/bf_f2_1231.2016.pdf [hereinafter Table F-2]; see also Caseload Statistics Data Tables,
ADMIN. OFFICE U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/caseload-statistics-
data-tables.  The discussion thus focuses on chapters 7 and 13.
33 See infra note 35.
34 See Katherine Porter, The Pretend Solution: An Empirical Study of Bankruptcy Outcomes,
90 TEX. L. REV. 103, 116 (2011) [hereinafter Porter, Pretend Solution] (describing chapter
7).
35 In practice more than 90% of chapter 7 cases are “no-asset,” meaning that the
debtor owns no property subject to liquidation by the trustee. See Ed Flynn, Gordon
Bermant & Suzanne Hazard, Chapter 7 Asset Cases, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Dec. 2002–Jan. 2003,
at 22, 22 (reporting that 96% of nonbusiness chapter 7 cases filed in 2002 were closed
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receive a discharge of most debts, typically within four to six months of
filing.36
In chapter 13, debtors keep all of their property,37 but must pay their
“disposable income” to their creditors over a three- to five-year repayment
plan approved by the bankruptcy judge.38  Only after the debtor successfully
completes plan payments will the bankruptcy court grant the discharge.
Because a household that files chapter 13 must journey from filing a petition
through plan confirmation and finally through plan completion, the chapter
13 process may take over six years.
Extensive data show that, historically, only about one-third of chapter 13
cases make it to a discharge.39  The remaining approximately two-thirds of
cases are dismissed or converted to chapter 7.40  If a chapter 13 case ends in
dismissal, the debtor is left without any forgiveness of debts.41  The Code also
limits how often a household may file bankruptcy depending on what chap-
ter was previously filed and whether the case ended with a discharge.42
without any money distributed to creditors); Dalie´ Jime´nez, The Distribution of Assets in Con-
sumer Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Cases, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 795, 797 (2009) (reporting that 93% of
nonbusiness chapter 7 debtors who filed in 2007 entered bankruptcy with no distributable
assets).  Debtors also generally can keep property encumbered by consensual liens in chap-
ter 7. See Pamela Foohey, Robert M. Lawless, Katherine Porter & Deborah Thorne, “No
Money Down” Bankruptcy, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 1055, 1061–62 (2017) (discussing retaining
property in chapter 7).
36 In the 2007 CBP, 97% of debtors who filed chapter 7 received a discharge.  Foohey
et al., supra note 35, at 1093 tbl.5; see also 11 U.S.C. §§ 523, 727 (detailing the discharge in
chapter 7); Braucher et al., supra note 22, at 394 (noting the timing of discharge in chapter
7); Porter, Pretend Solution, supra note 34, at 116 (noting the chapter 7 discharge rate).
37 The ability to keep all assets is chapter 13’s biggest financial advantage, and the
conventional wisdom is that chapter 13 is most useful as a tool to help save homes. See
Porter, Pretend Solution, supra note 34, at 117–18.
38 See id. at 116–18 (describing chapter 13 plans).
39 In the 2007 CBP, 36.5% of chapter 13 cases resulted in a discharge following plan
completion.  Sara S. Greene, Parina Patel & Katherine Porter, Cracking the Code: An Empiri-
cal Analysis of Consumer Bankruptcy Outcomes, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1031, 1042–43 (2017) (not-
ing that the one-third statistic has endured for decades); see also Porter, Pretend Solution,
supra note 34, at 107–09 (overviewing studies confirming the one-third statistic).
40 See Greene et al., supra note 39, at 1042–44 (reporting chapter 13 dismissal and
conversion rates).
41 See Porter, Pretend Solution, supra note 34, at 118 (noting the effect of discharge on a
debtor’s personal liability for debts).  Chapter 13 debtors who complete half of the plan
payments can be eligible for a hardship discharge if the reason for failure to complete plan
payments is “due to circumstances for which the debtor should not justly be held accounta-
ble.”  11 U.S.C. § 1328(b)(1).  Although no hard data are available, it is commonly
believed that hardship discharges are rare.
42 If a household received a discharge in chapter 7, it must wait eight years before
filing chapter 7 again or four years before filing chapter 13.  11 U.S.C §§ 727(a)(8),
1328(f)(1).  If a household received a discharge in chapter 13, it must wait two years before
receiving another discharge in chapter 13 or six years before filing chapter 7.  11 U.S.C.
§§ 727(a)(9), 1328(f)(2).  The bankruptcy court can prohibit a household from filing
another bankruptcy case if its case was dismissed with prejudice. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(g)(1).
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In the latest iteration of the Consumer Bankruptcy Project (“Current
CBP”), 63.5% of the cases were filed under chapter 7.  The use of chapter 7
versus chapter 13 varies widely by judicial district,43 but our sample reflects
the nationwide divide between chapters 7 and 13.44
Regardless of which chapter a debtor files, bankruptcy is expensive, con-
fusing, and time-consuming, particularly post-BAPCPA.  All debtors now
must submit extensive documentation45 and complete credit counseling and
financial management courses.46  The documentation requirements connect
with the “heart” of BAPCPA—the “means test.”47  The means test is meant to
serve as an income screen that restricts eligibility to file chapter 7, preventing
can-pay debtors from accessing chapter 7’s quick discharge.48  If a household
has too much income in comparison to allowed expenses and debts, then it
cannot file chapter 7.49  Every debtor who files must complete the means test,
even though very few people are barred from filing chapter 7 based on it.50
Each of these burdens may seem small individually, but cumulatively
they create a much larger bar to filing bankruptcy—“death by a thousand
cuts,” as BAPCPA has been described.51  These burdens also make bank-
ruptcy attorneys’ jobs more difficult and time-consuming, which increases
how much they charge their clients.52  Retaining a bankruptcy attorney
Dismissal of a prior case also weakens the protections of the automatic stay. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(c)(4)(A).
43 See Bob Lawless, (Yet Another) Chapter 13 Map, CREDIT SLIPS (Dec. 11, 2013, 3:59 PM),
http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2013/12/yet-another-chapter-13-map.html (map-
ping the percentage of all 2013 bankruptcy cases that were filed under chapter 13 in the
ninety federal judicial districts in the fifty states and the District of Columbia).  Our recent
article details why the use of chapters 7 and 13 varies widely by district. See generally Foohey
et al., supra note 35.
44 For instance, in 2016, 62% of nonbusiness cases were filed under chapter 7. See
Table F-2, supra note 32.
45 See Littwin, supra note 9, at 195–96 (discussing documentation).
46 11 U.S.C. §§ 109(h)(1), 727(a)(11), 1328(g); see also Littwin, supra note 9, at
196–98 (noting that these courses create hurdles to filing and discharge).  Attorneys have
deemed these courses “burdensome” and “a complete and utter waste of my clients’ time.” 
Id. (quoting from interviews with bankruptcy attorneys).
47 See Littwin, supra note 9, at 184 (describing BAPCPA); see also 11 U.S.C. § 707(b).
48 See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 2 (2005) (“The heart of the bill’s consumer bank-
ruptcy reforms consists of the implementation of an income/expense screening mecha-
nism (‘needs-based bankruptcy relief’ or ‘means testing’), which is intended to ensure that
debtors repay creditors the maximum they can afford.”); see also Lawless et al., supra note
13, at 352–53 (discussing the means test).
49 See Porter, Pretend Solution, supra note 34, at 119 (discussing the means test).
50 See Littwin, supra note 9, at 192–95 (discussing the means test and how most attor-
neys did not find that the means test posed a problem for their clients).
51 Amy Buttell Crane, Understanding the New Bankruptcy Law, MIRSEPASY L. OFFS.,
(2005), http://www.nwlink.com/~mloweb/bankruptcy2.html (quoting Travis Plunkett,
former legislative and regulatory affairs director for the Consumer Federation of America).
52 See Littwin, supra note 9, at 200 (“Uncertainty leads to difficulty advising clients as
well as to frequent litigation, resulting in expense clients can struggle to afford.” (footnotes
omitted)).
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always has been expensive for cash-strapped households, but the Current
CBP data confirm findings from other studies: attorneys’ fees have risen.53
Attorneys now charge an average of $1224 to file and represent the debtor in
chapter 7, and an average of $3442 to file and represent the debtor in chap-
ter 13.54  But filing bankruptcy pro se is difficult and jeopardizes a debtor’s
ability to receive a discharge.55  The vast majority of debtors thus employ an
attorney to file their cases.  In the Current CBP, 90.1% of all debtors used an
attorney to file their bankruptcy cases.56
B. The Financial Sweatbox, BAPCPA, and Bankruptcy Filings
The debates surrounding BAPCPA and BAPCPA’s effects provide useful
recent background on popular conceptions about when and why people file
bankruptcy, and how the timing of their filings relates to the financial sweat-
box.  BAPCPA is associated with a decrease in the number of bankruptcy
filings during the initial years following its enactment, which the coinvesti-
gators of the 2007 CBP linked to financially struggling households delaying
filing.57  Although BAPCPA aimed to decrease bankruptcy filings, consistent
with rhetoric surrounding its passage about people strategically filing “ban-
53 See Lupica, supra note 9, at 36–37, 57, 69 (finding that attorneys’ fees increased 24%
to 48% post-BAPCPA, depending on chapter, amount of administrable assets, and
discharge).
54 Attorneys’ fees are from Current CBP data.  See infra Part II for a discussion of the
CBP and its methodology.  The difference in cost relates to chapter 13’s relative complex-
ity. See Lupica, supra note 9, at 111–12 (overviewing how long attorneys report spending to
prepare a chapter 13 case).  Because of how attorneys report their fees, we are unable to
disaggregate attorneys’ fees from bankruptcy petition filing fees.  Most of the attorneys’ fee
data likely include the filing fee.  The filing fee is $335 for a chapter 7 case and $310 for a
chapter 13 case. See Foohey et al., supra note 35, at 1058 n.10.  For a discussion of how
attorneys’ fees affect bankruptcy filings, see generally id.
55 In a sample of chapter 13 cases filed pro se in 2007 and 2008, 0.8% of chapter 13
cases ended in a discharge.  In a sample of chapter 7 no asset cases filed in 2007 and 2008,
6.1% of the cases were filed pro se, but pro se cases made up 28.2% of the chapter 7 no
asset cases that ended in dismissal versus 5.5% of the cases that ended in discharge.  Like-
wise, in a sample of chapter 7 asset cases filed in 2007 and 2008, 3.3% of the cases were
filed pro se, but pro se cases made up 14.3% of the chapter 7 asset cases that ended in
dismissal versus 2.8% of the cases that ended in discharge.  Lupica, supra note 9, at 81, 139
tbl. A–7.
56 Debtors are more likely to hire an attorney to file chapter 13 than chapter 7—89.5%
versus 91.1% of debtors, respectively.  Some of the cases filed without an attorney likely
used a petition preparer. See Lupica, supra note 9, at 31 (finding in sample of cases filed in
2007 and 2008, 5.8% of the chapter 7 cases and 2% of the chapter 13 cases were filed pro
se).
57 Lawless et al., supra note 13, at 353, 357.
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kruptc[ies] of convenience,”58 it only sought to exclude those people who
truly could pay their creditors.59  This was not what happened.
Data from the 2007 CBP suggest that following BAPCPA, income corre-
lated with which families filed bankruptcy, with the means test functioning
“like a barricade, blocking out hundreds of thousands of struggling families
indiscriminately . . . .”60  Another nationwide study of filings post-BAPCPA
found that households in poorer zip codes were disproportionately less likely
to file: filings in poor neighborhoods decreased 32% more than filings in
rich neighborhoods.61  If income is considered a proxy for ability to pay, as it
is by the means test,62 then rather than stop can-pay debtors from filing,
BAPCPA more often prevents honest, but unfortunate cannot-pay debtors
from filing, while wealthier households enjoy unchanged access to
bankruptcy.63
That BAPCPA’s effect was to make bankruptcy less accessible reflects the
debates that led to its passage and the theory that the consumer credit indus-
try’s true goal was to pass a law that would extend the time people spend in
the sweatbox.64  When people are on the brink of default, lenders can charge
high interest rates and fees, and make more money.  Financially distressed
58 Mann, supra note 1; see 144 CONG. REC. S10787 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1998) (statement
of Sen. Grassley) (“The fact is that some people use bankruptcy as a convenient financial
planning tool to skip out on debts they could repay.”); Edith H. Jones & James I. Shepard,
Recommendations for Reform of Consumer Bankruptcy Law by Four Dissenting Commissioners, in 1
NAT’L BANKR. REVIEW COMM’N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 1043, 1044 (1997)
(“[B]ankruptcy has become a first resort rather than a last measure for people who cannot
keep up with their bills.”); Edith H. Jones & Todd J. Zywicki, It’s Time for Means-Testing,
1999 BYU L. REV. 177, 208 (“Bankruptcy is now too frequently a choice fostered by irre-
sponsible spending habits and an unwillingness to live up to commitments.”); see also supra
text accompanying note 10.
59 See Lawless et al., supra note 13, at 352–53 (discussing BAPCPA’s goals); Lupica,
supra note 9, at 27.
60 Lawless et al., supra note 13, at 353.
61 Timothy Layton, Frank McIntyre & Daniel Sullivan, Did BAPCPA Deter the Wealthy?
The 2005 Bankruptcy Reform’s Effect on Filings Across the Income and Asset Distribution (2010),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1708119; see also Stefania Albanesi & Jaromir Nosal, Insolvency
After the 2005 Bankruptcy Reform (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y. Staff Reports, Staff Report No.
725, 2015), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr7
25.pdf (finding that BAPCPA caused a permanent drop in chapter 7 filings concentrated at
the bottom of the income distribution).
62 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
63 See Albanesi & Nosal, supra note 61 (noting in the abstract that for low-income indi-
viduals, “BAPCPA may have removed an important form of relief from financial distress”);
Lawless et al., supra note 13, at 353 (“[T]here has been no shift in the income levels of
filers that would have occurred if . . . high-income abusers had been pushed from the
system.”).
64 See supra note 18.
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customers in the sweatbox are many lenders’ best customers,65 as demon-
strated by the $11.9 billion a year that the CARD Act saves consumers.66
To make its case for restricting access to bankruptcy and thus extend the
time consumers spend in the sweatbox, the consumer credit industry painted
a picture of profligate spending and uninhibited use of bankruptcy.67  This
picture was not new.  Rather, it was updated and embellished for more than a
decade.68  Proponents of this picture argued that reforms were necessary
because the “rising tide of bankruptcy filings” cost every moral, bill-paying
family $400 a year, a figure that made for “the best sound-bite in the
debate.”69  Proponents further linked people’s supposed propensity to file at
the first sign of financial trouble to a purported drastic decline in bank-
ruptcy’s stigma.70
None of the proponents’ claims were supported by evidence.  Propo-
nents never substantiated the often-cited “fact” that bankruptcy was costing
every American family $400 a year.71  The claim that bankruptcy courts were
filled with can-pay debtors was contradicted by decades of robust empirical
evidence that people file bankruptcy after experiencing exogenous shocks,
such as decline in income, increased expenses, job loss, divorce, and medical
problems.72  Based on this evidence, the related claim that bankruptcy’s
stigma had disappeared became suspect.73  If anything, comparing levels of
65 See Mann, supra note 1, at 379 (theorizing about lenders’ true motives with
BAPCPA).
66 See supra note 18.
67 See Mann, supra note 1, at 376 (noting that BAPCPA passed “[a]fter extensive lobby-
ing by banks and credit card companies”); Porter, Bankrupt Profits, supra note 1, at 1372–73
(stating that the financial practices of the creditors were not closely examined during
debates); Elizabeth Warren, The Phantom $400, 13 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 77, 77–78 (2004)
(describing the credit industry’s “public relations campaign to amend the bankruptcy
laws”).
68 See Warren, supra note 67, at 77–78.
69 Id. at 77.
70 See A. Mechele Dickerson, Regulating Bankruptcy: Public Choice, Ideology, & Beyond, 84
WASH. U. L. REV. 1861, 1891–92 (2006) (“Supporters [of BAPCPA] . . . suggested that
debtors lacked integrity because they no longer felt any personal obligation to pay debts
they could afford to repay.”); Porter, Bankrupt Profits, supra note 1, at 1376–77 (overview-
ing arguments that debtors were immoral “strategic actors” who used bankruptcy to shirk
their obligations).
71 See Warren, supra note 67, at 78–79.
72 See ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME TRAP 81 (2003)
(citing self-reported data from debtors to show that job loss, family breakup, and medical
problems were the reason for 87% of consumer bankruptcy filings); Porter, Bankrupt Prof-
its, supra note 1, at 1373–75 (arguing based on analysis of the credit industry’s solicitation
of bankruptcy debtors that its actions are consistent with the exogenous shocks model of
consumer bankruptcy filings, not the strategic or immoral actor models); supra note 19.
73 Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Less Stigma or More
Financial Distress: An Empirical Analysis of the Extraordinary Increase in Bankruptcy Filings, 59
STAN. L. REV. 213, 233–41 (2006) (refuting the declining stigma hypothesis).
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consumer debt and the number of bankruptcy filings, the stigma of filing
may have increased over past decades.74
Nonetheless, lured by tales of a $400 bankruptcy “tax,”75 Congress
embraced the consumer credit industry’s assertion that restricting eligibility
to and otherwise making it harder to file bankruptcy was the best policy.76
Consequently, rather than screening out can-pay debtors, BAPCPA punishes
everyone, especially lower-income households, increasing the financial dis-
tress of people who file bankruptcy.77  In reporting on the 2007 CBP data,
CBP coinvestigators wrote that the “rising debt loads are consistent with the
view that troubled families are delaying bankruptcy—struggling longer with
their bills and building up bigger loads of debt before succumbing.”78
In Part III, we analyze data from the Current CBP to expand on this
observation.  Between 2007 and now, though bankruptcy laws have remained
identical, people report struggling longer before filing.  That the pattern of
entry to bankruptcy relief has continued to change suggests that the sweat-
box of lending has only become hotter, and that bankruptcy has become
even less effective at helping with financial problems.
II. METHODOLOGY
Data for this Article come from the Consumer Bankruptcy Project
(CBP), a multiresearcher, long-term project that investigates the people who
file bankruptcy, their reasons for filing, and the consequences of their bank-
ruptcies.  The CBP uses a nationally representative sample and combines
data from bankruptcy court records and questionnaires.  Past iterations of
the CBP occurred in 1981, 1991, 2001, and 2007, giving us a historical base-
line against which to compare the current data (although only the 2007 data
were a national random sample).  The latest iteration of the CBP—the Cur-
rent CBP—began in 2013 and, at present, includes data about people who
filed bankruptcy during the four-year period from 2013 to 2016.  Three of
this Article’s authors have been involved with the CBP since 2001.
Because we will reference data from the 2001 and 2007 CBPs, a brief
review of those studies is appropriate.  These studies relied on cross-sectional
74 Id. at 242–47 (arguing that a growing number of families are in financial trouble,
but fewer are filing, which may mean that bankruptcy’s stigma has increased).
75 See Warren, supra note 67, at 84 (noting that the chair of the House Judiciary Com-
mittee of the House of Representative’s report cited as a fact that bankruptcy losses “trans-
late into a $400 annual ‘tax’ on every household in our [n]ation” (quoting 150 CONG. REC.
H148–02 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 2004) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner)).
76 See Porter, Bankrupt Profits, supra note 1, at 1371 n.4 (“[T]he standard characteriza-
tion of the legislation is a public-choice story that strongly emphasizes the consumer-credit
industry’s capture of Congress through lobbying and financial contributions.”).
77 See Lawless et al., supra note 13, at 353 (noting that the CBP data show that the
people who file bankruptcy are more laden with debt than in prior decades).
78 Id.; see also Wenli Li, Michelle J. White & Ning Zhu, Did Bankruptcy Reform Cause
Mortgage Default to Rise? 2, 23 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15968,
2010), http://www.nber.org/papers/w15968 (finding that BAPCPA caused mortgage
default rates to rise as people tried to pay their debts for a longer time).
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data collection, measuring a snapshot in time of bankruptcy cases filed by
individuals under chapter 7 and chapter 13 over a six-month time span.79
Because of technological limits, the 2001 CBP relied on random samples
from bankruptcy courts located in five judicial districts across the United
States, in rural and urban areas, believed to be nationally representative.80
With the widespread adoption of electronic court records, the 2007 CBP data
were drawn from a nationally random sample of chapter 7 and chapter 13
cases filed in the fifty states and the District of Columbia.  As with prior CBP
iterations, written questionnaires were mailed to the debtors who had filed
these cases.81  The questionnaires collected otherwise unavailable demo-
graphic information and asked debtors about their financial situations and
coping mechanisms leading up to their bankruptcy filings.  The 2007 CBP
data come from 2438 bankruptcy filings and questionnaires, as well as a sub-
set of approximately 1000 interviews.82  A full methodology of the 2007 CBP
is detailed elsewhere.83
We relaunched the CBP in 2013 as an ongoing data collection effort.
Rather than taking a snapshot of consumer bankruptcy filings from a short
period of time, the Current CBP collects data on an ongoing basis, providing
a database that builds incrementally and will allow for comparisons over time.
Like the 2007 CBP, the Current CBP sample is national and random.  Begin-
ning in February 2013 and every three months thereafter, we generate a list
of all cases filed by individuals under either chapter 7 or chapter 13 in the
fifty states and the District of Columbia for three randomly selected business
days.  From this group, 200 bankruptcy cases are randomly selected to com-
prise the sample.  The samples are collected in February, May, August, and
November, and include cases filed at the beginning, middle, and end of a
month.84
As with the 2007 CBP, a mailing list is generated from the debtors’
addresses as listed on the bankruptcy petition.  We mail an introductory let-
ter to each debtor explaining the project.  A written questionnaire is mailed
three to four days later.  Debtors may complete the questionnaire via mail or
79 We exclude cases filed by debtors that are legal entities, such as corporations.  Cases
filed by individuals are included regardless of whether the petition indicates the case
involves primarily business or consumer debts. See Robert M. Lawless & Elizabeth Warren,
The Myth of the Disappearing Business Bankruptcy, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 743, 764–68 (2005)
(explaining how software for nonsubstantive reasons may miscategorize cases as business
or consumer).
80 For a discussion of the methodologies for the 1981, 1991, and 2001 CBPs, see Kath-
erine Porter, Appendix: Methodology of the 2007 Consumer Bankruptcy Project, in BROKE: HOW
DEBT BANKRUPTS THE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 19, at 235, 235.
81 Id. at 237.
82 Id. at 237, 242.
83 Id. at 236–44 (detailing the 2007 CBP methodology); Lawless et al., supra note 13, at
396–97 (detailing the interviews).  This Article does not rely on the telephone interviews.
84 A detailed discussion of the methodology of the Current CBP is included in the first
article relying on Current CBP data.  Foohey et al., supra note 35, at 1072–74.
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online, and are offered a fifty-dollar gift card from Walmart or Amazon for
participating.85
Data collected from the bankruptcy court records and the written ques-
tionnaires include demographic and household information, reasons for fil-
ing bankruptcy, money management tactics used prior to filing, hardships
experienced before filing, emotional responses to bankruptcy, and basic
health information.86  Many of the 100-plus variables in the Current CBP
were also included in the 2007 CBP and prior CBP iterations.  When we com-
pare findings with the 2007 CBP or earlier CBP iterations, we adjust dollar-
denominated data, such as asset values and debt amounts, for inflation to July
2016 dollars based on the Consumer Price Index.87
In this Article, we report from people who filed bankruptcy in 2013,
2014, 2015, and 2016.  These data include information from a total of 3200
bankruptcy cases sampled during these four years.  Of the 3200 households
sent questionnaires, a total of 910 questionnaires were returned for a 28.4%
response rate.88
III. PROLONGED STRUGGLES IN THE SWEATBOX
The Current CBP data show that bankruptcy filers still have many char-
acteristics of the American middle class, as they did in the 2007 CBP and
prior iterations of the CBP.  More than three-fourths of households have at
least one employed or self-employed person, the highest-educated adult in
the household has completed at least some college, half of households con-
tain a married couple or permanent partners, and half of households include
at least one minor child.89  About half of households that file own homes.90
Of course, the CBP households are not typical of the middle class in one
way—they are deeply indebted and lack the resources to deal with these
85 Id. at 1073 (detailing how debtors are solicited to complete the questionnaires).
86 Id. at 1071–73 (describing data collection procedures).
87 See generally Consumer Price Index, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.gov/cpi
(last visited Aug. 24, 2018).
88 The questionnaires sent to households as part of the 2007 CBP had an approxi-
mately 50% response rate.  Lawless et al., supra note 13, at 393.  We believe that the exis-
tence of research funding that allowed much greater efforts in 2007 to follow up with
nonrespondents through telephone calls and other means primarily influenced the differ-
ence in response rates.
89 In the 2007 CBP and Current CBP, respectively, 79.5% and 74.8% of households
included at least one person who was employed or self-employed.  In the 2007 CBP, the
highest-educated adult in 59.4% of households had completed at least some college; in the
Current CBP, the highest-educated adult in 59.1% of households had completed at least
some college.  In the 2007 CBP, 51.3% of debtors reported living with a spouse or perma-
nent partner when they filed bankruptcy, as compared to 47.2% in the Current CBP.  In
the 2007 CBP, 52.7% of the cases were of a household containing a minor, as compared to
47.4% in the Current CBP.
90 In the 2007 CBP and Current CBP, respectively, 50.0% and 44.7% of debtors owned
homes.
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debts.  In the Current CBP, the median household has total debts of just over
$100,000 and a low monthly income of around $2650.91
Our analysis shows one very notable difference between the people who
filed bankruptcy in 2007 and those who filed more recently.92  People indi-
cated that they waited longer to file.  Postponement of filing bankruptcy
comes with potentially damaging repercussions of spending additional years
drowning in debt that cannot realistically be repaid, and the accompanying
stressors of trying to pay it back despite this reality.  The following sections
detail how long people struggle with their debts before filing bankruptcy,
and the consequences of their extended struggles.
A. Longer Stays in the Sweatbox
Data from the questionnaires directly describe debtors’ prebankruptcy
timeline.  We asked debtors how long they seriously struggled with their
debts before they filed bankruptcy—that is, how long they lived in the sweat-
box.  Similar to prior CBP iterations, in the Current CBP, debtors were lim-
ited to six preset categories: did not seriously struggle, fewer than six months,
at least six months but less than one year, at least one year but less than two
years, at least two years but less than five years, and five years or more.93  In
the Current CBP, very few people (7.1%) reported resorting to bankruptcy
after less than six months of serious financial struggles, and only 15.1% strug-
gled for less than a year.  The hardship period before filing bankruptcy must
be measured in years, not weeks or months.
Debtors’ modal response was a period of struggling for between two and
five years.  Two-thirds (66.4%) of households struggled to pay their debts for
more than two years.94  And almost a third (30%) of households reported
91 In the 2007 CBP, the median debtor had total debts of $100,037.30 and monthly
income of $2617.69.  In the Current CBP, the median debtor had total debts of
$100,401.70 and monthly income of $2693.55.  Because the means are heavily influenced
by outliers, the medians are generally better indicators of central tendency, which is why
medians are reported.
92 Age also has changed.  The median age of people who file bankruptcy shifted right
between the 2007 CBP and the Current CBP, from forty-three to forty-nine.  In other
recent work, we explored reasons for the shift that do not relate to prolonged struggling.
Deborah Thorne, Pamela Foohey, Robert M. Lawless & Katherine Porter, Graying of U.S.
Bankruptcy: Fallout From Life in a Risk Society (Aug. 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3226574.  Additionally, when we divided the Current CBP sample
into those debtors who reported struggling for less than two years and those who reported
struggling for more than two years, which seems to be households’ tipping point in terms
of struggling, we did not find a statistically significant difference in the ages of the two
groups.  Bankruptcy remains a largely midlife experience.
93 In the 2007 CBP, the two categories with the least amount of time struggling were
“[l]ess than 3 months” and “[m]ore than 3 months less than 6 months.”  Lawless et al.,
supra note 13, at 382 fig.12.
94 During the Current CBP’s four-year period, debtors reported struggling for simi-
larly long periods of time.  For instance, 65.9%, 70.4%, 67.0%, and 62.8% of households
indicated they struggled for more than two years in 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016.
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suffering through serious financial problems for five years or longer.  Most
people did not file bankruptcy as an immediate solution to their financial
difficulties.
People who sought bankruptcy relief in the Current CBP also waited
even longer than in the past, about ten months longer if we convert our
categorical responses into a continuous measure using the midpoint of each
category.  The mean period of time that a household in the Current CBP
seriously struggled with their debts before filing bankruptcy exceeds three
years.95
FIGURE 1.  “BEFORE BANKRUPTCY, HOW LONG DID YOU STRUGGLE?”
2007 CBP VS. CURRENT CBP
0% 10% 20% 30% 40%
5+ yrs.
2-5 yrs.
1-2 yrs.
6 mos. - 1 yr.
<6 mos.
2007 CBP Current CBP
Note: Respondents in the 2007 CBP and Current CBP were asked, “Before you filed
bankruptcy, how long did you seriously struggle with your debts?”  Figure 1 reports
the percentage of respondents indicating each time struggling category.  It combines
the two categories with the least amount of time struggling.
This change reflects a marked shift in behavior in a short period of time,
particularly given no changes in bankruptcy law.  The currently reported
mean time of three years struggling is more than twice the length of the
average engagement before a first marriage96 and equals the time between
when a baby is born and when that child typically enters preschool.  Every
95 For the ultimate category of “5+ years,” we assumed the person struggled for five
years.  The mean time spent struggling in 2007 was 2.3 years.  This is a statistically signifi-
cant difference (t = 11.19, p < .001) from the 3.1 years reported in the Current CBP.
96 See Jaimie Mackey, What Is the Average Length of an Engagement?, BRIDES (Oct. 28,
2017), https://www.brides.com/story/how-long-should-you-be-engaged-before-marriage
(“The average engagement length in the U.S. is between 12 and 18 months . . . .”).
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three years is literally when a blue moon (as in “once in a blue moon”)
occurs.97
The changes between the 2007 and the Current CBP occur across the
entire distribution of debtors.  Two to five years of struggling still is the
modal answer in both studies, but the percentage of households struggling
five years or more has increased by more than twofold.  Correspondingly,
shorter struggles are less common.  The likelihood that a household will
struggle with debts for less than a year has declined by two-and-a-half times in
less than a decade.
Additionally, the increase between 2007 and the Current CBP in how
long people report struggling before filing bankruptcy is a continuation of a
trend since 2001.  In the 2001 CBP, the longest interval category available was
more than two years.98  In 2001, about one-third (32.6%) of debtors indi-
cated “[m]ore than two years.”99  In 2007, that percentage rose to 43.8% in
2007, an increase of more than a third.100
Because two years of struggling remains the tipping point for house-
holds, in detailing life in the sweatbox, we emphasize those debtors who
reported struggling for two years or more—“long strugglers,” as we call them.
To highlight the consequences of the time long strugglers spend in the sweat-
box, we often compare their experiences to those of other debtors.  Nonethe-
less, these other debtors also spent time in the sweatbox, just less.  Only 3%
of debtors in the Current CBP reported that they “did not seriously struggle”
before filing.  The sweatbox is a reality for almost everyone who files bank-
ruptcy, even if the time spent in it is less miserable for some people.
B. Limitations
The data show a remarkable increase in how long people report strug-
gling with their debts before filing bankruptcy.  Because what it means to
“seriously struggle” is open to interpretation, we purposely focus on the rate
of change across CBP iterations in presenting our findings.  Although we
think that people’s general conception of what it means to “seriously strug-
gle” with their debts has not changed between CBP iterations, we cannot
eliminate with certainty the possibility that how respondents answered the
question varied over time.  The wording of the question and the number of
choices is the same across CBP iterations, but the Current CBP questionnaire
includes longer time categories for the least amount of time spent strug-
gling.101  However, debtors’ responses increased at the higher end of the
preset categories, which are the same across CBP questionnaires.  It seems
97 Blue moons occur about every two to three years. See Robert Martin, Friday Is the
Last Blue Moon Until 2018, WEATHER CHANNEL (July 27, 2015), https://weather.com/sci
ence/space/news/blue-moon-july.
98 Lawless et al., supra note 13, at 382 fig.12.
99 Id.
100 Id. For a graphical comparison of the results from the 2001 CBP and the 2007 CBP,
see id.
101 See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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unlikely that the adjustment of the preset categories prompted a change in
how debtors answered the question.
Apart from the wording of the CBP questionnaire itself, between 2007
and the Current CBP’s timeframe world markets experienced the Great
Recession.102  Living through disruptive economic times may have altered
how people thought about what it means to “seriously struggle” with their
debts because their attitudes about the economy and finances changed.
Hard economic times may amplify how people experience their financial
problems, leading debtors to report that they “seriously struggled” to pay
their debts for a longer time prior to filing than they would have absent living
through the Great Recession.  Alternatively, people may see their family,
friends, and neighbors dealing with financial problems and discount the
severity of their own struggles.  Debtors’ reports of how long they seriously
struggled before filing actually may understate the duration of their strug-
gles, and, concomitantly, our results would underestimate the increase in
time people seriously struggle before filing.
Surveys that ask people their attitudes about the economy provide useful
proxies to assess whether people’s views of what it means to “seriously strug-
gle” may have changed in recent years.  These proxies suggest that people’s
attitudes about the economy now are similar to their attitudes in 2007.  For
instance, the consumer confidence index, which is based on people’s plans
for major purchases and their current and projected future economic situa-
tion, was essentially the same in 2007, when it averaged 100.1, and between
2013 and 2016, when it averaged 100.0.103
Similarly, the General Social Survey asks people to evaluate their eco-
nomic well-being.104  In 2008, 70.4% of respondents indicated that they were
satisfied or more or less satisfied with their financial situation, as compared to
73.4% of respondents in 2014.105  Likewise, in 2008, 39.9% of respondents
indicated that they thought their financial situation had stayed the same
“[d]uring the last few years,” a percentage that remained relatively stable
102 The National Bureau of Economic Research dates the Great Recession as between
December 2007 and June 2009. THE NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, BUSINESS CYCLE
DATING COMMITTEE (2010), http://www.nber.org/cycles/sept2010.pdf.
103 Leading Indicators—Consumer Confidence Index (CCI), ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION
& DEV., https://data.oecd.org/leadind/consumer-confidence-index-cci.htm (last visited
Dec. 17, 2017).  Between 2007 and 2013, the CCI decreased and then increased, along with
the economic downturn and recession. Id.  The CCI averaged 99.1, 99.7, 100.7, and 100.6
in 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016, respectively.
104 GSS General Social Survey, NORC AT THE U. OF CHI., http://gss.norc.org/ (last visited
Dec. 18, 2017).
105 TOM W. SMITH, JAESOK SON & BENJAMIN SCHAPIRO, NORC AT THE U. OF CHI., GEN-
ERAL SOCIAL SURVEY FINAL REPORT: TRENDS IN PUBLIC EVALUATIONS OF ECONOMIC WELL-
BEING, 1972–2014 7 tbl.2 (2015) http://www.norc.org/PDFs/GSS%20Reports/GSS_Econo
micWellBeing15_final_formatted.pdf.
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through 2014.106  And Pew Research Center’s poll that tracks Americans’
views on the economy shows a sharp drop in outlook by the end of 2007 and
a steady increase through the Current CBP’s timeframe.107
In short, although our findings could be an artifact of time or reflect an
unidentifiable selection effect among respondents, there is little reason to
think that there has been a fundamental change in how people think about
“seriously struggling” with debts.  Plus, our data show a substantial shift in
how long people report struggling before filing bankruptcy.  People’s views
about what it means to “seriously struggle” also would have had to change
massively between 2007 and the Current CBP’s timeframe for how debtors
answer this question to explain our findings.  We now turn to a description of
what life is like in the sweatbox for the debtors in the Current CBP.
C. Financial and Legal Life in the Sweatbox
The time that long strugglers spend in the sweatbox takes a noticeable
toll.  Long strugglers arrive at the bankruptcy courthouse with more
problems to solve, and more wear on their lives than other debtors.  On a
financial basis, as summarized in Table 1, long strugglers are in awful finan-
cial shape.
TABLE 1.  COMPARISON OF MEDIAN FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS, CURRENT
CBP, LONG STRUGGLERS VS. OTHER DEBTORS
Long Other
Strugglers Debtors
Total assets $28,036 $51,610
Secured debts $18,042 $37,002
Unsecured debts $44,227 $34,848
Total debts $98,430 $94,288
Monthly income $2524 $2517
Total debt-to-asset ratio 2.19 1.50
Total debt-to-income ratio 2.62 2.42
% homeowners 40.8% 50.9%
% homeowners with involuntary liens 66.4% 50.9%
% collection action filed against debtor 50.3% 35.6%
Note: Table 1 reports financial characteristics for all people who filed bankruptcy (from the
Current CBP, divided between those who reported struggling for more than two years
(“long strugglers”) and those who reported struggling for less than two years (“other
debtors”).  All data are inflated to July 2016 dollars based on the Consumer Price Index.
106 Id. at 6 tbl.1, 99 (reporting that 37.6% and 41.5% of respondents in 2010 and 2012,
respectively, indicated that their financial situation had stayed the same “[d]uring the last
few years”).
107 Bruce Stokes, As Republicans’ Views Improve, Americans Give the Economy Its Highest
Marks Since Financial Crisis, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 3, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/
fact-tank/2017/04/03/americans-give-economy-highest-marks-since-financial-crisis/.
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By the time they file, at the median, long strugglers owe more than twice
the value of what they own.  Their median debt-to-asset ratio is over 40%
higher than other debtors—2.19 versus 1.50 (z = -4.01, p < .001).  Most nota-
bly, long strugglers are less likely to own a home when they file than other
debtors (c2 (1, N = 869) = 7.96, p = .005).  Their lower homeownership rate is
apparent in their lower median amounts of total assets and secured debts.  If
we restrict the sample to homeowners (N = 384), the dire financial condi-
tions of long strugglers become starker.  The median long struggler owes
more secured debts—$137,480 versus $116,303 (z = 1.84, p = .066), as well as
more unsecured debts—$43,288 versus $38.375 (z = 1.14, p = .253).
In addition, as reported in Table 1, of those long strugglers who still own
their homes, two-thirds arrive at bankruptcy court with an involuntary lien,
such as a tax lien, against their home.  The median long struggling house-
hold with an involuntary lien owes $4065 on the lien.  This is more than
150% of one month’s income for a long struggling household, assuming no
taxes and expenses.  The median amount that long strugglers owe on the lien
starkly contrasts with the median of $1482—about 60% of one month’s
income—owed by other debtors that enter bankruptcy with a lien against
their home.
As debts secured by property, involuntary liens generally increase the
likelihood that debtors will lose their homes, particularly given the relatively
high amounts owed by long struggling families.  Involuntary liens also serve
as an indication of struggling and failing to make ends meet.  They attach
upon continued nonpayment of overdue debts by operation of law, such as
tax liens, or by judicial process initiated by creditors, such as unsecured
creditors.
Actual collection actions against debtors are another indication of debt-
ors’ inability to make ends meet, and provide another powerful signal to
overindebted households that their financial situations are irremediable.
Consistent with the higher incidence of attachment of involuntary liens, as
reported in Table 1, half of long strugglers also had a collection action filed
against them prior to filing bankruptcy.  As detailed in Section III.D, long
strugglers tried to work with their creditors.  But despite these and other
efforts, for a majority of long struggling debtors, life in the sweatbox includes
appearing as a defendant in a lawsuit.
When long strugglers file bankruptcy, they are financially drained.
Based on their financial situations, particularly their low homeownership
rates, filing chapter 7 makes the most sense.108  Long strugglers indeed are
statistically significantly more likely to file chapter 7 than other debtors.
Seven in ten (70.8%) of long struggling debtors filed chapter 7, as compared
to 58.5% of other debtors (c2 (1, N = 892) = 13.54, p < .001).  Recall that, on
average nationwide, about two-thirds of consumer bankruptcy cases are filed
108 On a financial basis, chapter 13 is most useful to keep assets. See supra note 37.
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under chapter 7, meaning that those people who struggle longer are slightly
more likely than the average debtor to file chapter 7.109
Although our data cannot speak to how debtors’ financial situations
change while they live in the sweatbox, there is reason to think that long
strugglers’ time in the sweatbox is marked by asset depletion and increasing
debts.  Foreclosure and other collection techniques necessarily result in the
loss of property, whether by a sale of assets or the garnishment of wages,
which decreases a household’s ability to pay other debts.  And as described in
Section III.D, long strugglers’ coping techniques include selling property
more often than other debtors.  Long strugglers may be more likely to be in
worse financial shape before entering the sweatbox, which also could explain
why they arrive at bankruptcy court with fewer assets and higher debts.  But
long strugglers’ reports about their struggles to pay their debts suggest that
during the extra time that they spend in the sweatbox, as compared to other
debtors, they deplete their assets, lose their homes, and run up their debts.
Regardless of the cause, their lack of assets may drastically affect their ability
to achieve long-term benefits from bankruptcy’s discharge.
D. Coping in the Sweatbox
Delays in filing bankruptcy exact more than financial tolls on individuals
and families.  Long strugglers report going to great lengths to try to pay back
their debts.  The CBP questionnaire asks debtors what they did “to try to
make ends meet,” and provides them a list of twelve common coping mecha-
nisms, such as asking creditors for help and working more hours.110  Table 2
reports those coping mechanisms that long strugglers reported using much
more often than other debtors.
Despite their lower homeownership rates, long strugglers were more
likely than other debtors to indicate coping mechanisms related to houses,
suggesting that they worked hard to try to save their homes.  Although the
majority of all debtors asked their creditors for help, a full two-thirds of long
strugglers reported asking creditors to “work with them” generally, and a
quarter reported asking for a loan modification or to refinance their mort-
gage specifically.  Still, one out of ten long strugglers sold their house to
make ends meet, double the percentage of other debtors.  And almost half of
long strugglers specified that they pawned other property.
109 See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text.  Prior literature addresses chapter
13’s success rate, based on discharge, to conclude that filing chapter 13 often may not be
the most effective use of bankruptcy. See Greene et al., supra note 39, at 1085–90 (identify-
ing factors that make completing chapter 13 bankruptcy more likely); Porter, Pretend Solu-
tion, supra note 34, at 113 (stating that chapter 13 is “a pretend solution” and calling for a
“redesign [of] bankruptcy relief to be simpler and blunter”); William C. Whitford, Has the
Time Come to Repeal Chapter 13?, 65 IND. L.J. 85, 104–05 (1989) (arguing that chapter 13’s
repeal will best serve the interests of the greatest number of debtors).  As such, that long
strugglers file chapter 7 more often than other debtors may make their use of bankruptcy
more productive.
110 Respondents also may select “something else” and write a response.
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TABLE 2. COMPARISON OF “COPING” MECHANISMS, CURRENT CBP,
LONG STRUGGLERS VS. OTHER DEBTORS
Long Other
Strugglers Debtors
Ask creditors to “work with you” 67.0% 57.2%
Obtain loan modification, refi, or home equity
loan refi 25.6% 17.4%
Sell house 11.5% 5.0%
Sell or pawn car, furniture, or other property 47.9% 37.8%
Worked more hours or got another job 66.6% 53.2%
# coping mechanism (mean) 5.5 4.7
Note: Respondents in the Current CBP were provided a list of twelve common coping
mechanisms commonly used to address financial distress and asked to identify the ones
they used “to try to make ends meet.”  “Long strugglers” are respondents who identified in
a separate question that they “struggled” for more than two years before filing bankruptcy.
All differences are statistically significant at p < .01, using a chi-squared test for the
differences in percentages and a t-test for the difference in the mean on the number of
coping mechanisms.
These efforts to make ends meet align with the low value of long strug-
glers’ assets.  That long strugglers sold their homes and pawned other prop-
erty is even more significant given that two-thirds of debtors also reported
working more in order to make ends meet.  Although long strugglers on
average reported using more than five coping mechanisms trying to make
ends meet while living in the sweatbox, their efforts seemed to be of little
avail.
E. Going Without in the Sweatbox
In addition to reaching out to creditors, selling property, and working
more, long strugglers also report going without many necessities during the
years they struggle to pay their debts.  Similar to the question about coping
mechanisms, the CBP questionnaire asked debtors what they had to go with-
out because of their financial situation, and provided respondents with a list
of thirteen items, such as medicine, food, utilities, car repairs, and paying the
mortgage or rent.  Long strugglers’ responses paint a bleak picture, particu-
larly as compared to other bankrupt debtors.
Long strugglers’ responses about their healthcare stand out most starkly.
The CBP questionnaire’s list of necessities includes five related to people’s
health: medical attention, mental healthcare, dental care, medications, and
health insurance.  Long strugglers report going without each of these items
much more often than other debtors, as depicted in Figure 2.  Consequently,
we combined them into a five-item “health-related” privation index for Table
3 (alpha = .76).
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FIGURE 2.  COMPARISON OF HEALTH-RELATED PRIVATIONS, CURRENT CBP,
LONG STRUGGLERS VS. OTHER DEBTORS
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Long Strugglers Other Debtors
Note: Respondents in the Current CBP were provided a list of thirteen privations com-
monly experienced by households in financial distress and were asked to identify
which of the items they had to “go without.”  Figure 2 reports the answers to the five
privations related to health.  “Long strugglers” are respondents who identified in a
separate question that they “struggled” for more than two years before filing bank-
ruptcy.  All differences are statistically significant at p < .05 using a chi-squared test.
Most prominent among long struggling debtors’ health-related priva-
tions is medical attention, which likely relates to these debtors also going
without health insurance.  Considered together, as reported in Table 3, on
average, long strugglers indicated that they went without more health-related
necessities as compared to other debtors.  Almost one-third (31.7%) of long
strugglers went without four or five health-related items.  Another 20.9%
went without three of these items, meaning that more than half of long strug-
glers go without at least one of the health-related necessities.
In the short term, people may be able to manage health-related issues,
but most of these problems are not temporary or self-healing.111  When
untreated, health problems escalate and cost even more—in terms of money,
and in terms of time, stress, pain, and worry.  Foregoing the range of health-
related necessitates illustrates the lengths that long strugglers will go to try to
111 For instance, almost half of Americans live with a chronic condition, such as heart
disease, cancer, arthritis, and respiratory diseases.  Many of these conditions lead to hospi-
talization and long-term disability. MEGAN COMLOSSY, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGIS-
LATORS, CHRONIC DISEASE PREVENTION AND MANAGEMENT  2–3 (2013), http://www.ncsl
.org/documents/health/chronicdtk13.pdf.
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repay their debts, and raises concerns about their physical and mental wel-
fare during their journeys to bankruptcy courts.
TABLE 3.  COMPARISON OF PRIVATIONS, CURRENT CBP, LONG STRUGGLERS
VS. OTHER DEBTORS
Long Other
Strugglers Debtors
Health-privation index (mean) 2.5 2.0
Went without food 31.9% 24.1%
Went without utilities 22.1% 14.6%
Went without other insurance 39.8% 27.0%
total # of privations (mean) 4.1 3.3
Note: Respondents in the Current CBP were provided a list of thirteen privations
commonly experienced by households in financial distress and were asked to identify
which of the items they had to “go without.”  “Long strugglers” are respondents who
identified in a separate question that they “struggled” for more than two years before filing
bankruptcy.  Table 3 reports the debtors’ choices for a five-item “health-privation” index as
well as answers to other privations where the differences were statistically significant (p <
.05).  The differences in the privations index and total number of reported privations are
also statistically significant (p < .01).
Long strugglers’ willingness to sacrifice does not end with healthcare.
Table 3 reports other items that long strugglers reported going without
much more often than other debtors.  Long struggling households were
more likely than other debtors to indicate that they went without the basic
necessities of food and utilities.  In contrast, all debtors reported going with-
out other less necessary items—car repairs, funding retirement accounts, and
continuing education—at similar rates (that were not statistically significant
differences).  Of the privations listed on the CBP questionnaire, food, utili-
ties, and healthcare arguably are the most basic necessities, and needs that
should not go unmet because of overindebtedness.
F. Ending Life in the Sweatbox
The CBP questionnaire also lists eleven “things” that might lead people
to file bankruptcy, such as medical expenses, divorce or separation, and unaf-
fordable mortgage payments.  For each, respondents selected from a four-
point Likert scale with the poles of “very much agree” and “very much disa-
gree,” or could select “not applicable.”112  Long strugglers’ responses to
these questions tell a tale of the accumulated effect of their coping tech-
niques and privations.  Table 4 lists those reasons that long strugglers
reported much more often than other debtors.
112 When reporting answers, we include “not applicable” with “very much disagree.”
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TABLE 4.  COMPARISON OF REASONS FOR FILING BANKRUPTCY, CURRENT CBP,
LONG STRUGGLERS VS. OTHER DEBTORS
Long Other
Strugglers Debtors
Unaffordable mortgage payments 45.9% 31.4%
Home foreclosure 26.5% 17.9%
Divorce 27.2% 19.4%
Medical expenses 60.9% 52.3%
Pressure from debt collectors 81.2% 69.7%
Note: Respondents in the Current CBP were asked out of a list of eleven items what “things
contributed to” their filing bankruptcy.  For the question asking which of “the following
things contributed to your bankruptcy,” respondents were given a four-point Likert scale:
“very much agree,” “somewhat agree,” “somewhat disagree,” and “very much disagree.”
Respondents also could indicate the item was “not applicable” to them as a reason for
bankruptcy.  Any respondent who said they “very much agreed” or “somewhat agreed” was
counted as citing that particular choice as a reason for their bankruptcy.  Table 4 reports
the reasons that were statistically different (p < .05) between long strugglers and all other
bankruptcy filers.
Despite trying to work with creditors, particularly to obtain loan modifi-
cations and forbearances, long struggling debtors often cited unaffordable
mortgage payments and foreclosure actions as contributors to their filings.
Long strugglers also highlighted divorce as influencing their filings more
often than other families.  This reason likewise may reflect their lower home-
ownership rates.  Divorce splits one household into two, and along with the
split, may make it more difficult to keep up with mortgage payments, result-
ing in involuntary liens and foreclosure.113
The effects of long strugglers’ health-related privations emerge in one of
the most often cited contributors to their filings—medical expenses.114
Long strugglers were 30% more likely to “very much agree” that medical
expenses contributed to their filings than other debtors—39.8% versus
30.5%.  Although long strugglers are willing to forego healthcare and insur-
ance, they nonetheless seem to incur burdensome medical debts—debts
which catch up with them and chase them to the bankruptcy system for
protection.
113 See WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 72, at 107–12 (discussing the financial conse-
quences of divorce); Jerry Anthony, Home Burdens: The High Costs of Homeownership, in
BROKE: HOW DEBT BANKRUPTS THE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 19, at 65, 75 (noting that
marital status is related to housing costs, “with homeownership seeming to be particularly
expensive for people who are not married”).
114 Besides collection efforts, which are discussed infra, the only contributor that long
strugglers agreed with “very much” and “somewhat” more often was income.  Almost 80%
of long strugglers cited income as a contributor to their filing.  Likewise, 74% of other
debtors cited income as a contributor.  Debtors’ responses make sense.  A lack of sufficient
income in relation to debts is why people file bankruptcy.
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Of all the contributors to their filings, long strugglers’ dealings with debt
collection stood out.  As shown in Figure 3, long strugglers were much more
likely to report “pressure from debt collectors” as a reason for their bank-
ruptcy as compared to other bankrupt debtors.  Most notably, less than half
of other debtors indicated that they “very much agreed” that debt collection
was a reason for their bankruptcy filings, as compared to six in ten of long
strugglers.
FIGURE 3.  PRESSURE FROM DEBT COLLECTION WAS REASON FOR BANKRUPTCY,
CURRENT CBP, LONG STRUGGLERS VS. OTHER DEBTORS
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Note: Respondents in the Current CBP were asked whether pressure from debt collec-
tors contributed to their filing bankruptcy.  Figure 3 reports the percentage of
respondents indicating each level category, divided between those who reported
struggling for more than two years (“long strugglers”) and other debtors.  Respon-
dents could indicate “not applicable.”  Those respondents who selected “not applica-
ble” are included in the “very much disagree” category.
Part of the story of long strugglers’ collapse into bankruptcy almost cer-
tainly is the reckoning with involuntary liens and actual collections actions
discussed above that are clear markers of irreparable financial situations.115
In addition to creditors’ legal actions, the persistent “drum beat” of collec-
tors’ calls also may wear on people, eventually leading to bankruptcy as a
solution to their problems.116
115 See supra Section III.C.
116 See Ronald J. Mann & Katherine Porter, Saving Up for Bankruptcy, 98 GEO. L.J. 289,
314–15 (2010).
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G. What Makes People Stay in the Sweatbox?
What might explain why the majority of people report struggling for so
many years before they file bankruptcy, enduring collection attempts, work-
ing more, going without necessities, and losing their property?  Our data can-
not answer this question directly, but we can use the data to explore whether
long strugglers differ in important ways from debtors who report struggling
for less time.  Before exploring the characteristics of long struggling debtors,
we caution that an unmeasured variable may be at work, and that we cannot
prove why people are electing to battle with their severe financial distress for
a longer period of time before filing bankruptcy.  Nonetheless, there are two
important ways in which long strugglers differ from other debtors that we
think are important parts of the story of why people report waiting longer to
file.
First, long struggling debtors differ from other debtors on one notable
demographic characteristic—education.  The CBP has repeatedly inquired
about education levels.  In reporting on the 2007 CBP data, one of this Arti-
cle’s authors noted that the population of bankruptcy filers was more highly
educated than the general United States population, and that Americans
with some college education, but who had not completed a four-year degree,
were the group most likely to file bankruptcy.117
Across all debtors in the 2007 CBP and Current CBP, the general distri-
bution of educational achievement has changed modestly, with slight differ-
ences at the distribution’s tails.  There are fewer debtors with very low levels
of education, particularly those without a high school diploma or GED—
10.4% versus 7.3% in the 2007 and Current CBP, respectively.  And the per-
cent of debtors who have four-year college degrees and more advanced
degrees has increased—16.7% versus 20.8% in the 2007 and Current CBP,
respectively.  Focusing solely on debtors in the Current CBP, as shown in
Figure 4, more notable differences exist between long strugglers’ and other
debtors’ educational attainment.
117 Katherine Porter, College Lessons: The Financial Risks of Dropping Out, in BROKE: HOW
DEBT BANKRUPTS THE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 19, at 85, 86–87.
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FIGURE 4.  EDUCATION LEVELS OF PEOPLE IN BANKRUPTCY, CURRENT CBP,
LONG STRUGGLERS VS. OTHER DEBTORS
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Note: Respondents in the Current CBP were asked about their educational levels.  Fig-
ure 4 reports the percentage of respondents indicating each educational level cate-
gory, divided between those who reported struggling for more than two years (“long
strugglers”) and other debtors.
This relationship also can be conceptualized as the percentage within
each educational cohort that reports a long struggle.  Among those debtors
with a high school degree or less, 61.9% reported struggling for more than
two years.  In comparison, 70.9% of debtors with at least a four-year college
degree reported struggling more than two years.  Debtors with more educa-
tion are waiting longer to seek bankruptcy help.
Higher education levels could contribute to a longer delay in filing
bankruptcy for two key reasons.  People with more education may experience
more fear about bankruptcy’s stigma, whether as a pure matter of belief, or
because they are more likely to have careers for which filing bankruptcy
could be a substantial problem.118  College degrees also may equip people
with more knowledge of, or a willingness to assert their legal rights in
advance of bankruptcy.  More educated individuals may call the bluffs of debt
collectors, understand whether they can protect their assets from seizure and
118 For example, despite passing the bar exam, law school graduates may not be admit-
ted to particular states’ bars if they have filed bankruptcy because they may be deemed not
to have the requisite character, fitness, and moral qualifications to practice law as demon-
strated by their “financial irresponsibility.”  Lori Shaw, What Does it Take to Satisfy Character
and Fitness Requirements?, STUDENT LAW., Oct. 2008, at 12, 14.
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judgment, or use nonbankruptcy tools, such as a cease-and-desist letter under
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), to stave off debt
collectors.119
Second, long strugglers differ from other debtors on one feeling about
their bankruptcy filings—shame.  We asked debtors about their feelings
upon filing, and provided a list of major emotions—such as anger, relief, and
shame—and a four-point Likert scale with poles of “not at all” and “a great
deal.”120  Debtors who struggled longer were much more likely to indicate
that they felt shame “somewhat” or a “great deal” than those who struggled
for less than two years—71.1% versus 61.8% (c2 (3, N = 875) = 11.39, p =
.010).  Anticipating feeling shame upon filing bankruptcy may push people
to delay filing and to spend more time in the sweatbox.  Although long strug-
gling debtors indicated that they felt shame upon filing more often than
other debtors, overall, less than a third (32.0%) of all debtors responded that
they felt shame “not at all” or only “a little bit.”  The majority of people who
seek bankruptcy protection experience filing as shameful.121
IV. DEBT COLLECTION AND INCREASED TIME IN THE SWEATBOX
Why do people now report struggling longer to pay their debts before
filing bankruptcy?  It could be that people simply are struggling longer.  But
long strugglers’ responses about their higher education levels and feeling
shame upon filing, coupled with their highlighting of debt collection pres-
sures as a reason for their filings and that half have been sued by their credi-
tors prior to their filing,122 suggest another hypothesis more consistent with
our findings.
Both higher education and shame at the thought of using the bank-
ruptcy system may counsel people dealing with crushing debts to put off fil-
ing.  Indeed, some people may never file bankruptcy at all, especially if they
experience few external pressures, such as wage garnishment, that encourage
filing.  One significant external pressure comes from creditors’ efforts to col-
lect past due debts.  In approximately the last ten years, debt origination,
collection, and buying have changed dramatically.  These changes in turn
may have altered how some people think about their debt problems as legal
problems addressable by using law, possibly even altering who files bank-
119 15 U.S.C. § 1692c (2012) (providing that a debt collector must cease communicat-
ing with a debtor upon receipt of a “ceasing communication” letter).
120 See Pamela Foohey, Calling on the CFPB for Help: Telling Stories and Consumer Protection,
80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 177, 189–90 (2017) (discussing basic and major emotions).
121 This result supports the theory that filing bankruptcy remains stigmatized. See supra
notes 73, 74, and accompanying text.  Stigma can strongly influence feelings of shame,
particularly depending on what culture values are marked as worthy of stigmatizing others
for their nonconformity. See Paul Gilbert, Evolution, Social Roles, and the Differences in Shame
and Guilt, 70 SOC. RES. 1205, 1215–19 (2003) (discussing how shame and stigma are linked
with cultural values). See generally ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT
OF SPOILED IDENTITY (1963) (linking stigma, social identity, and cultural values).
122 See supra tbl.1.
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ruptcy, bringing long struggling debtors to bankruptcy as a way to deal with
creditors.
Americans always have lived in debt and creditors always have dealt with
delinquencies.123  A generation ago, the creditors demanding payment from
debtors often were the businesses that provided goods or services, such as
family doctors and local grocers, and the local banks that financed large
purchases, such as houses and cars.  In contrast, debts now overwhelmingly
are owed to the faceless corporation that issued the credit card used to
purchase goods and services,124 and to the equally large bank (and increas-
ingly nonbank) that provided financing to purchase a car or home.125  Rela-
tionships that once included local and personal elements have become
business dealings divorced from actual transactions.  When debtors fall
behind on payments, the lack of a personal relationship may temper the
urgency of paying, while emboldening creditors and debt collectors to try to
collect.
This transformation from personal relationship to mere financial trans-
action marks an institutional shift in debtor-creditor relations.  Although the
changes in how debts are originated and collected started several decades
ago, the most noticeable shift in out-of-court debt collection seems to have
occurred in the last ten years.  The shift is traceable in part to the Great
Recession’s liquidity crisis, which flooded the developing debt-buying market
with charged-off debt, putting more Americans at risk of being called by debt
collectors.126  The Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates that the number of
bill or account collectors grew 64% between 1998 and 2015, from approxi-
mately 288,000 to about 472,000 individuals.127  Reports published by the
123 See generally LOUIS HYMAN, DEBTOR NATION: THE HISTORY OF AMERICA IN RED INK
(2011).
124 See Robert Harrow, Largest U.S. Credit Card Issuers: 2017 Market Share Report,
VALUEPENGUIN, https://www.valuepenguin.com/largest-credit-card-issuers (last updated
June 27, 2017) (“[T]he largest 10 credit card issuers . . . together hold roughly 89% of total
revolving credit card debt in the United States.”).
125 See Michele Lerner, The Mortgage Market Is Now Dominated by Non-Bank Lenders, WASH.
POST (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www. .com/realestate/the-mortgage-market-is-now-domi-
nated-by-nonbank-lenders//02/22/9c6bf5fc-d1f5-11e6-a783-cd3fa9_.?utm_=.4c638a15250f
(noting that in 2011, 50% of new mortgage dollars were loaned by three big banks, but by
2016, those banks’ share dropped to 21% while six of the top ten lenders were nonbanks);
Trefis Team, Which U.S. Banks Hold the Largest Share in the Country’s Auto Lending Industry?,
NASDAQ (Nov. 11, 2016), http://www.nasdaq.com/article/which-us-banks-hold-the-largest-
share-in-the-countrys-auto-lending-industry-cm708154 (listing the banks with the largest
market share in auto loans).
126 See Jime´nez, supra note 25, at 92 (overviewing the liquidity crisis’ effect on charge-
offs and debt buying).
127 Richard M. Hynes, Bankruptcy and State Collections: The Case of the Missing Garnish-
ments, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 603, 646–47 (2006) (discussing Bureau of Labor Statistics data
and noting that “[t]he available evidence does, however, suggest an increase in the use of
nonjudicial collections methods, such as dunning letters or telephone calls” in recent
years); Occupational Employment and Wages, May 2015, BUREAU LAB. STAT., https://www.bls
.gov/oes/2015/may/oes433011.htm#ind (last visited Oct. 2, 2018).
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Federal Trade Commission and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
highlight the problems consumers report encountering with debt collectors,
indicating that collection methods have shifted.128
Our data likewise suggest that debt collections’ drum beat has noticeably
altered in recent years.129  The 2007 CBP questionnaire asked debtors about
their reasons for filing bankruptcy in a slightly different way from the Cur-
rent CBP questionnaire.  Instead of a list of eleven items that contributed to
their bankruptcy filings, in the 2007 CBP, debtors could choose from a list of
twenty items.  And instead of allowing debtors to answer on a four-point
Likert scale, the 2007 CBP questionnaire provided debtors with a binary
choice of “yes” or “no” for each item.  Among the twenty items in the 2007
CBP questionnaire was “aggressive collection efforts by creditors.”  Thus, in
asking about “pressure from debt collectors,” the Current CBP questionnaire
includes a broader debt collection category.
In the Current CBP, 77.6% of all debtors either “very much agreed” or
“somewhat agreed” that “pressure from debt collectors” contributed to their
filings.  In comparison, in the 2007 CBP 43.8% of all debtors identified
“aggressive collection efforts by debtors” as a reason for their filings.  As with
debtors in the Current CBP, those debtors in the 2007 CBP who reported
struggling with their debts for more than two years were more likely to report
that “aggressive collection efforts” was a reason they filed bankruptcy.  More
than half (55.7%) of the 2007 CBP’s long strugglers cited this reason versus
41.4% of the 2007 CBP’s other debtors (c2 (1, N = 1,020) = 20.71, p < .001).
Although the comparison between the 2007 CBP and Current CBP is not
perfect because of changes in the question, these results generally support
the idea that debt collection efforts are greater now than they were in 2007.
Additionally, over the last ten years, in-court debt collection has
increased, particularly by debt buyers.130  For example, an analysis of collec-
128 See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CONSUMER EXPERIENCES WITH DEBT COLLECTION 5
(2017), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201701_cfpb_Debt-Collection-
Survey-Report.pdf (reporting on consumers’ complaints about debt collectors); NAT’L
CONSUMER LAW CTR., CONSUMER DEBT COLLECTION FACTS (2018), https://www.nclc.org/
images/pdf/debt_collection/Debt-Collection-Facts-2016.pdf (collecting facts about the
debt collection industry); FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES OF THE DEBT
BUYING INDUSTRY (2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents//practices-
debt-buying-industry/debtbuyingreport.pdf (discussing debt buyers).
129 See supra note 116.
130 Paul Kiel, So Sue Them: What We’ve Learned About the Debt Collection Lawsuit Machine,
PROPUBLICA (May 5, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/so-sue-them-what-weve-
learned-about-the-debt-collection-lawsuit-machine (overviewing “the growing use of the
courts to collect consumer debts”).  Based on studies of debt collection, it is difficult to
determine conclusively how much lawsuit activity has increased. See Richard M. Hynes,
Broke but Not Bankrupt: Consumer Debt Collection in State Courts, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1, 3–5 (2008)
(discussing debt collection in Virginia and noting that “there are signs that consumer debt
collection accounts for a substantial portion of the civil filings in many states”).  Nonethe-
less, long strugglers in particular report debt collection pressures as a trigger of filing bank-
ruptcy, and their court records indicate that more than half were sued by their creditors
prior to filing. See supra Section III.F, tbl.4.
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tion suits filed in Florida, Missouri, New Jersey, and New Mexico counties
shows that the number of collection lawsuits filed by debt buyers significantly
increased beginning around 2006 and 2007.131  Some debt buyers file so
many lawsuits that their employees have admitted to “[r]obo-signing” affida-
vits to accompany the pleadings at a rate of 200 to 400 a day.132
The institutional shift in relationships between creditors, debt collectors,
and American families may have changed how long struggling debtors think
about how to deal with their debt problems.  Long strugglers necessarily have
the wherewithal, including education, but also simple grit to postpone filing
bankruptcy for a very long time.  They also overwhelmingly feel shame in
needing to file.133  For some long strugglers, bankruptcy always may have
been an option that they knew about and considered.  But without creditors’
out-of-court collection efforts and lawsuits serving as an extra push, long
strugglers may have put off filing forever.
Alternatively, for some long strugglers, creditors’ collection efforts and
lawsuits may prompt them to view what they had thought of as money
problems as legal problems with legal solutions, including filing bankruptcy.
Every delinquent debt raises legal issues.  But not everyone will think of col-
lection attempts as legal actions or of the possibility of stopping those
attempts with bankruptcy.  People often view legal problems as personal
problems to be dealt with outside of the legal system—by doing nothing,
through self-help, or by seeking the assistance of a third party.134  Research
shows that people consistently do nothing when faced with money problems
that raise civil legal issues.135  Even if people are aware of applicable law, they
do not evoke law in response to civil legal problems, such as persistent calls
131 Kiel, supra note 130 (tracking collection suits filed from in the 1990s through 2014).
132 Peter A. Holland, Notes From the Trenches: Current Trends in Consumer Junk Debt Buyer
Litigation, 49 MD. B.J. 18, 26 (2016) (citing CFPB, 47 States and D.C. Take Action Against
JPMorgan Chase for Selling Bad Credit Card Debt and Robo-Signing Court Documents, CONSUMER
FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (July 8, 2015), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/
newsroom/cfpb-47-states-and-d-c-take-action-against-jpmorgan-chase-for-selling-bad-credit-
card-debt-and-robo-signing-court-documents/) (discussing actions against debt buyers); see
Fred O. Williams, Robo-Signed Collection Cases Under Fire, CREDITCARDS.COM (Apr. 17, 2013),
https://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/debt-buyer-robo-signing-under-fire-1282
(discussing litigation brought against Midland Funding regarding robo-signing).
133 See supra Section III.G.
134 See Rebecca L. Sandefur, The Fulcrum Point of Equal Access to Justice: Legal and Nonlegal
Institutions of Remedy, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 949, 951 n.5 (2009) [hereinafter Sandefur, Ful-
crum Point] (defining a “civil justice problem” as “one that has civil legal aspects and raises
civil legal issues, though the person who has the problem may never think of as it a legal
problem and may never take legal action to try to resolve it”); Rebecca L. Sandefur, The
Importance of Doing Nothing: Everyday Problems and Responses of Inaction, in TRANSFORMING
LIVES: LAW AND SOCIAL PROCESS 112, 114 (Pascoe Pleasence et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter
Sandefur, Importance of Doing Nothing] (discussing what people do when they encounter a
justiciable problem); supra note 28.
135 See Sandefur, Importance of Doing Nothing, supra note 134, at 112, 123 (discussing why
people often take no action to address money problems).
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from debt collectors.136  At some point, a problem in someone’s life trans-
forms into a legal problem that a person may choose to address with a legal
solution.137
Every collection attempt is an occasion for a debtor to identify collec-
tors’ calls and lawsuits as implicating law.  Instead of collection remaining
“alegal[ ]” for long struggling debtors,138 persistent collection attempts from
unfamiliar people and businesses may transform the inability to meet one’s
financial obligations into a legal problem.  And in an environment of superfi-
cial debtor-creditor relationships, the shameful act of filing bankruptcy to
manage a personal debt relationship may become an acceptable legal action
to deal with a tenuous business affiliation.
In short, changes in how delinquent debts are bought, sold, and col-
lected may have altered which households file bankruptcy, bringing long
struggling debtors into the system who would not have filed in prior decades.
With long strugglers actually filing bankruptcy, the length of time people
report struggling with their debts prior to filing necessarily would increase.
Given the benefits and costs of filing bankruptcy, it makes sense that the
people who file still overwhelmingly have markers of middle-class status.139
But the specific households that make up the middle class in bankruptcy very
well may be different as compared to 2007 and prior decades.140
136 See Catherine R. Albiston & Rebecca L. Sandefur, Essay, Expanding the Empirical
Study of Access to Justice, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 101, 117 (defining the “demand side” of law as
“how people come to think about and act on their potentially justiciable experiences”);
Sandefur, Fulcrum Point, supra note 134, at 950 (“In the United States and other developed
nations, most civil justice problems are never taken to law.”).  To the extent that people
did not know about bankruptcy, conceptualizing their money troubles as legal problems
might prompt them to search for information about legal solutions, including bankruptcy.
But before debtors look for information about bankruptcy, they need to view their
problems as legal.
137 This is a complex process described by the “naming, blaming, claiming” framework.
William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and Transformation of
Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . ., 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631, 644–47 (1980); see also
Leon H. Mayhew, Essay, Institutions of Representation: Civil Justice and the Public, 9 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 401, 403 (1975).
138 Sandefur, Fulcrum Point, supra note 134, at 953.
139 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
140 Between 2007 and 2016, the total number of households that filed bankruptcy each
year rose and then fell.  For case filing statistics, see Caseload Statistics Data Tables, U.S. CTS.,
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/caseload-statistics (last visited Nov. 4, 2018).
There are many reasons for why filings would increase or decrease despite certain peo-
ple—here, long strugglers—being more likely to file bankruptcy, such as outstanding con-
sumer debt and people’s income. See Bob Lawless, Bankruptcies Down 12% in 2014, Forecast
Predicts the Same Decline for 2015, CREDIT SLIPS (Jan. 8, 2015, 3:25 PM), http://www.credit
slips.org/creditslips/2015/01/bankruptcies-down-12-in-2014-forecast-predicts-the-same-
for-2015.html (detailing “a mathematical model that . . . captur[es] the variation in bank-
ruptcy filing rates”).  That our hypothesis suggests that more long strugglers filed bank-
ruptcy in recent years does not require that the total number of households that filed also
increase.
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Although changes in debt buying and collection emerge as the most
plausible explanation consistent with the data for why people report strug-
gling longer with their debts before filing bankruptcy, other plausible
hypotheses exist.  Chief among these explanations is the continuing effects of
BAPCPA’s changes to consumer bankruptcy.  Bankruptcy practice likely sta-
bilized within a year or so of BAPCPA’s passage, which is when the 2007 CBP
sample was taken.  However, it could have taken debtors longer to fully
account for BAPCPA.  Research regarding “social spillover”—how the actions
of others in people’s neighborhoods can influence their decisions—indicates
that consumer bankruptcy filing rates increase in a given year if filing rates in
the same area increased the prior year.141  Scholars link these results with
people learning about bankruptcy from their networks of friends, family,
coworkers, and neighbors.142  Based on this theory, much of the knowledge
transmission within communities about BAPCPA’s hurdles to filing presuma-
bly occurred in the year or two after its enactment.  It is conceivable, how-
ever, that it may have taken longer for social spillover’s full effects to affect
the timing of bankruptcy filings.
A small portion of the increase in time debtors report struggling
between 2007 and the Current CBP thus may be attributable to BAPCPA
rather than to a force outside the bankruptcy system.  Nonetheless, the per-
centage of long strugglers already increased significantly between the 2001
and 2007 CBPs, coinciding with BAPCPA.  Given that the percentage of long
strugglers increased significantly yet again between the 2007 CBP and Cur-
rent CBP, and during a time when bankruptcy law remained unchanged, it is
more plausible to look to forces outside of the bankruptcy system.143
Ultimately, our research design cannot choose between competing
explanations for the increase in how long people report struggling with their
debts before filing bankruptcy.  Regardless, the Current CBP has uncovered a
significant change in how people seem to be filing bankruptcy.  As explored
in the next Part, longer delays before filing bankruptcy raise concerns about
the harms of life in the sweatbox.  Future experimental or quasi-experimen-
tal research designs with larger datasets that take a long-term view of house-
hold finances may help to answer questions about the mechanisms behind
why people are struggling longer.
141 See Foohey, supra note 28, at 1329–31 (overviewing social spillover in the context of
consumer bankruptcy).
142 See id. (noting that this “learning” may be about bankruptcy’s procedures, costs, and
benefits, or about whether a person’s community views filing bankruptcy as stigmatizing).
143 The transformation of debtor-creditor relations began decades ago.  Prior increases
in how long people report struggling with their debts prior to filing thus partly may be
attributable to changes in debt collection.  Debtors’ reports about how long they spend in
the sweatbox prior to filing increased between the 2001 CBP and 2007 CBP. See supra
notes 98–100 and accompanying text.  BAPCPA’s enactment during the years between
those two CBP iterations may have obscured the reality that a portion of the increase was
attributable to the changing nature of debt collection.
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V. CONSEQUENCES OF YEARS LIVING IN THE SWEATBOX
From a financial perspective, people seriously struggling with debt
should file bankruptcy sooner rather than later.  Although it may be specu-
lated that for some long struggling debtors, their delay may negate the need
to file bankruptcy because their financial situation will resolve itself, most
people who file owe debts that simply cannot be repaid absent a miracle or a
lottery win.  The median debt-to-income ratio of people who filed during the
Current CBP was 2.46, meaning that it would take debtors almost two and a
half years to repay what they owe, assuming they applied all of their income
to their debts.  Far from being a first resort, bankruptcy is the last refuge for
struggling families, and their decisions to file do not reflect the utilitarianism
bankruptcy law presumes.144
Based on their responses to the CBP questionnaire, for the people who
ultimately file bankruptcy, their delay in filing only deepens the financial
mire.  The time they spend struggling negatively impacts their daily lives and
likely harms their ability to realize bankruptcy’s “fresh start.”145  What debt-
ors tell us about their time in the sweatbox, combined with other research
about living with effectively unpayable debts, provides an invaluable descrip-
tion of consumer credit’s and bankruptcy’s place in America’s economy and
life.
A. The Costs of Financial Misery
To squeeze a few more dollars out of their lives, people work overtime,
forego basic necessities, face serious health consequences, deal with persis-
tent debt collection calls, end up in court, lose homes, and sell what little
they own.  Behind this list of statistics of long strugglers’ time in the sweatbox
are families whose lives are altered by their prolonged struggles.  Combined
with other research about the consequences of overindebtedness, our data
provide important details about the effects of years living in the sweatbox.
Financial misery hurts families.146  For couples, financial distress is
“complicated by the internal dynamic of the household.”147  Struggling with
unmanageable debts can strain marriages and relationships.148  Fights over
144 See supra Section I.B.
145 See supra note 20.
146 See Katherine Porter, The Damage of Debt, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 979 (2012)
(overviewing the possible harms of unmanageable debt); Pottow, supra note 1, at 411
(“The debtor’s family and others in her circle of intimates suffer too, experiencing the very
tangible psychological and monetizable costs when a debtor endures general default.”).
147 Mann & Porter, supra note 116, at 317–18.
148 See generally MARIANNE COOPER, CUT ADRIFT: FAMILIES IN INSECURE TIMES (2014) (dis-
cussing how families dealt with money problems during the Great Recession); Deborah
Thorne, Women’s Work, Women’s Worry?: Debt Management in Financially Distressed Families, in
BROKE: HOW DEBT BANKRUPTS THE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 19, at 136 (overviewing the
stress of debt on relationships).
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how to make ends meet,149 shifting of responsibilities for dealing with ever-
worsening finances,150 and watching loved ones deal with the emotional dis-
tress that comes with money troubles151 may lead to separation and
divorce.152  Splitting one household into two only worsens the financial
problems.  In contrast, filing bankruptcy may actually salvage some
relationships.153
For parents, financial troubles are compounded with worries over how
the kids cope with the hardships.154  If homes are foreclosed, children are
displaced along with their parents, and may switch schools, possibly more
than once, as their parents find a workable living situation.155  Home loss is
linked with educational regression.156  Even if children are not displaced,
they notice their parents’ financial distress.  Schedules change, diets change,
149 Thorne, supra note 148, at 147 (reporting that 80% of couples stated that they
experienced increased tension and more frequent fights prior to filing bankruptcy).
150 Deborah Thorne, Extreme Financial Strain: Emergent Chores, Gender Inequality and Emo-
tional Distress, 31 J. FAM. & ECON. ISSUES 185, 185 (2010) (interviewing couples who had
filed bankruptcy and finding that the “mundane chore of paying bills” transforms into
multiple chores before bankruptcy for which women become disproportionately responsi-
ble); Thorne, supra note 148, at 139 (finding that when “debts routinely outstrip income,”
the chore of paying mounting bills disproportionally falls to women).
151 Thorne, supra note 148, at 141 (finding that for both men and women, stress,
insomnia, and depression accompanied overindebtedness).
152 See Jonathan D. Fisher & Angela C. Lyons, Till Debt Do Us Part: A Model of Divorce and
Personal Bankruptcy, 4 REV. ECON. HOUSEHOLD 35, 48 (2006) (exploring the relationship
between divorce and bankruptcy and noting that “future research” on marital disruption
needs to more carefully model the role that financial distress plays within a marriage);
Thorne, supra note 148, at 147, 149–51 (noting that “marital satisfaction [prior to bank-
ruptcy] decreased as the reported levels of stress associated with debts increased” and
exploring a possible causal relationship between financial problems and separation and
divorce).
153 See Thorne, supra note 148, at 152 (positing that BAPCPA might “exacerbate the
connection between financial distress and marital dissolution”).
154 See generally ILONA PINTER, DAVID AYRE & EMILY EMMOTT, THE CHILDREN’S SOC’Y, THE
DAMAGE OF DEBT: THE IMPACT OF MONEY WORRIES ON CHILDREN’S MENTAL HEALTH AND
WELL-BEING (2016), https://www.childrenssociety.org.uk/sites/default/files/the-damage-
of-debt-2016.pdf (detailing the results of interviews with parents and children in the
United Kingdom about the effect of debt problems on children’s well-being); Elizabeth
Warren, Essay, Bankrupt Children, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1003 (2002) (discussing children and
bankruptcy).
155 See Marianne B. Culhane, No Forwarding Address: Losing Homes in Bankruptcy, in
BROKE: HOW DEBT BANKRUPTS THE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 19, at 119, 130–32 (overview-
ing the effects of home loss on children, and noting that some children switched schools
more than once); Warren, supra note 154, at 1004 (noting that children having to change
schools is one of the consequences of bankruptcy).
156 Culhane, supra note 155, at 130.
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and activities are scaled back as parents cut spending.157  Such changes can
confuse children, resulting in behavioral and emotional problems.158
The effects of prolonged financial problems extend beyond families to
workplaces and communities.  Existing in a state of money scarcity damages
people’s ability to lead productive lives.159  Merely determining how one will
survive day to day depletes people’s mental resources.160  This leaves little
energy for attending to anything else,161 including one’s job, threatening
people’s livelihoods and leading to further economic drain.162  People with-
draw from society, adding to their isolation.163  And the costs of life in the
sweatbox are magnified by people’s reported underutilization of health-
related services and insurance, which can permanently harm people’s
health.164
The nonfinancial consequences of life in the sweatbox can be stated in
terms of well-being and the ability to live productive and healthy lives, or in
terms of externalities of unmanageable debt.165  These consequences exist
alongside the financial drain that occurs when people voluntarily sell their
assets to pay their debts or when creditors resort to debt collection and legal
actions.166  The full cost of debtors’ prebankruptcy privations, particularly
health related, remains unknown, but undoubtedly is borne by all Americans.
It may seem counterintuitive, perhaps unbelievable, that people would
sacrifice so much when doing so undoubtedly goes against their interests.
But debtors’ reported behavior in trying to cope with unmanageable debts
parallels research regarding how people with “underwater” mortgages acted
during the Great Recession’s mortgage crisis.  Underwater homeowners—
people whose houses were worth less than the mortgages owed on them—
generally were unwilling to abandon their homes, instead continuing to
make mortgage payments despite having no reasonable prospects of recoup-
157 See id. at 132; Porter, supra note 146, at 1020–21 (recounting interviewed debtors’
answers regarding how unmanageable debt impacted their family relationships and
children).
158 See Culhane, supra note 155, at 132; Sue Shellenbarger, When Tough Times Weigh on
the Kids, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 24, 2008), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1222209493277688
79 (“[C]hildren are actually silent carriers of family financial stress.”).
159 See SENDHIL MULLAINATHAN & ELDAR SHAFIR, SCARCITY: WHY HAVING TOO LITTLE
MEANS SO MUCH 1–16 (2013) (discussing how the lack of a valuable resource—time,
money, food—“captures the mind” and causes people to focus on that which is scarce to
the exclusion of other tasks).
160 See id. at 9–52 (overviewing the effect of scarcity on “fluid intelligence” and finding
that money concerns reduce a person’s IQ by the equivalent of thirteen to fourteen
points).
161 See id. at 35–38 (describing the “tunneling tax”).
162 See Porter, Damage of Debt, supra note 146, at 990 (“[T]he harms of debt may rever-
berate from the indebted individual to that person’s family, workplace, and larger
community.”).
163 See id. at 1011 (discussing social exclusion).
164 See id. at 1006–07 (discussing health-related privations).
165 See id. at 984.
166 See id. at 1005 (noting the financial consequences of unmanageable debts).
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ing their losses.167  Even if they understood their untenable financial situa-
tions, homeowners refused to abandon what amounted to sinking ships
because, as Brent White argued, they felt fear, shame, and guilt about their
situations.168  These emotional and social constraints that people felt seemed
to have been “actively cultivated by the government, the financial industry,
and other social control agents in order to induce individual homeowners to
act in ways that [were] against their own self-interest . . . .”169
The mortgage crisis presents another tale of consumer lending’s sweat-
box.  It also underscores the link between shame and financial failure that
marks long strugglers’ journeys to filing bankruptcy.  And it highlights the
role of the financial industry and government regulations, or lack thereof, on
the industry in preserving consumer credit’s sweatbox.
B. Accessing the Fresh Start
Bankruptcy laws provide a textbook example of how law can falter when
knowledge about the problems to be regulated are discounted or ignored.
Bankruptcy laws, in part, provide a check on consumer lending.170  When
Congress passed BAPCPA, it turned a blind eye to evidence about the
problems bankruptcy must handle, and people reported struggling longer
with their debts before filing.171  Severe financial problems—such as those
experienced by most people who file bankruptcy—plunge households into a
deep, dark hole.  Bankruptcy laws, in effect, provide a ladder out of that hole,
helping people get back to level financial ground.  The ladder’s height
should have been—and supposedly was—determined by the hole’s depth.
Indeed, the consumer credit industry and other proponents of BAPCPA
effectively argued that the hole that the bankruptcy system must help debtors
out of was shallower than presumed.  And thus, BAPCPA shortened the lad-
der by making it harder and more expensive for people to file bankruptcy.
This Article’s findings show that financial distress’s hole is deeper than
previously thought.  Our data further show that, contrary to their own inter-
ests, people play a role in digging the hole.  People also watch assets vanish
through creditors’ lawsuits and out-of-court collection efforts, while seeing
their debts accumulate.
Miscalculation of the depth of bankrupt debtors’ financial distress
derives partly from faulty conceptions about people’s decision-making pro-
167 See generally Brent T. White, Underwater and Not Walking Away: Shame, Fear, and the
Social Management of the Housing Crisis, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 971 (2010).
168 Id. at 971–72.
169 Id. at 972.
170 See Theodore Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REV. 953, 981–83
(1981) (discussing discharge as allocating risk of loss between debtor and creditor);
Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1426
(1985) (noting that discharge “leaves the determination of whether to extend credit to
creditors, . . . who are better able, by observing individual debtors or by employing specific
contractual covenants, to monitor individuals’ consumption of credit”).
171 See supra Section I.B.
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cess about filing bankruptcy.  The primary goal of consumer bankruptcy,
both chapters 7 and 13, is to provide the debtor with a fresh start through the
discharge of debts—that is, to get people back on level financial ground.
Utilitarianism and economic productivity inform the most pervasive justifica-
tions for granting people a discharge.172  Debtors’ presumed utilitarian cal-
culation that underlies debates about access to bankruptcy supposes more
knowledge about law and shrewdness about timing than our data suggest
people have.  People’s willingness to file is diminished further by feelings of
shame about using bankruptcy, even when filing is clearly financially benefi-
cial.  Combined, the bankruptcy system is severely hampered in delivering
the fresh start it is assumed to bestow on struggling families.
Receiving a true fresh start involves more than simply discharging most
debts.  Bankruptcy’s discharge does not magically allow people to avoid
future financial problems or to be equipped to meet future financial chal-
lenges.  As research by two of this Article’s authors has shown, receiving a
discharge in chapter 7 does not always translate to an improved financial
situation.173  For a significant minority of debtors, their financial situation
remains the same or even worsens in the months after they receive a dis-
charge.174  Likewise, less than half of chapter 13 filings result in either a dis-
charge of debt or a significant other goal, such as saving a home.175
Whether people will encounter financial problems postbankruptcy
depends on a variety of factors, but most prominently income.176  Financial
problems also emerge because of expenses, such as medical bills, which may
increase unexpectedly.177  In some instances, if a family has some cash and
other assets saved, those assets may provide enough cushion to make it
through a rough patch of unemployment or to cover unexpected expenses.
The longer people struggle to pay their debts before they file bank-
ruptcy, the more assets they lose or sell and the more debt they incur.  Some
of this debt may be nondischargeable, leaving them with less of a fresh start
172 See, e.g., Margaret Howard, A Theory of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1047, 1085 (1987) (“[M]andating [conditional debt relief] comes down to a diminu-
tion of the goal of economic productivity.”); Jackson, supra note 170, at 1433 (describing
the economic benefits of allowing people to discharge their debts in terms of human capi-
tal); Warren, Principled Approach, supra note 11, at 492 (“[Americans] need the chance to
remain productive members of society, not driven underground or into joblessness by
unpayable debt.”).
173 See generally Porter & Thorne, supra note 20.
174 See id. at 69, 84 (reporting that 65% of interviewed debtors indicated that their
financial situation improved postbankruptcy, and that 25% of debtors indicated that pay-
ing bills remained a struggle postbankruptcy).
175 See Porter, supra note 146, at 1017.
176 Porter & Thorne, supra note 20, at 70 (identifying “one key trait that distinguished
those families who continued to struggle after bankruptcy: [l]ack of adequate steady
income”).
177 Id. at 105 (“[M]edical problems significantly correlate with families’ postbankruptcy
financial well-being.  Medical problems were second only to job and income problems as
reasons for a family’s worse-off financial situation.”).
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postdischarge.178  Of more concern, people who enter bankruptcy with few
assets necessarily leave bankruptcy with few assets, regardless of applicable
exemptions.179  Fewer assets in turn mean that these households will face
greater difficulties with the postdischarge challenges that bear on whether
people are able to realize their fresh starts.
Overall, our data show that the promise of bankruptcy’s discharge and
fresh start has become even more attenuated.  As people struggle to pay their
debts longer before filing bankruptcy, fewer people should be expected to
recover financially once they file.  Narratives and knowledge about which
people file bankruptcy, why they file, and when they file affect the structure
of the Bankruptcy Code and whether the bankruptcy system itself will strug-
gle to help families get back on their feet.
CONCLUSION
Contrary to claims that people who file bankruptcy are profligate over-
spenders looking for an easy break as a “first resort,”180 the Current CBP data
show that the individuals and families who seek refuge in the bankruptcy
system try to pay their debts for an increasingly longer time prior to filing.
The time that they spend in the sweatbox goes against their best interests and
reduces their ability to achieve a fresh start.  Rather than a calculated cost-
benefit analysis, for most debtors, filing bankruptcy seems to be a shameful
option of last resort.
Besides waiting longer to file, little about the people who file bankruptcy
has changed over the last decade.  Bankruptcy laws likewise have remained
unchanged since BAPCPA.  At their core, the results presented in this Article
show consumer credit policies still have a key role to play in mitigating the
harms of crushing debts, and that the bankruptcy system is less effective than
previously assumed.
Prior to every household’s bankruptcy filing are years of participation in
the credit economy.  Consumer credit laws and policies represent the first
line of defense against the escalation and compounding of unmanageable
debts’ hardships.  They provide the best way to balance the harms of lending
with its benefits.  These regulations are not meant to prevent borrowing, but
rather to mitigate or prevent the financial harms and externalities that result
from crushing debts.181  The results of the CARD Act provide a prominent
178 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 523, 727, 1328 (2012) (providing for the discharge in chapter 7 and
13).
179 See sources cited supra note 35 (discussing exemptions and “no-asset” cases).
180 Warren, Principled Approach, supra note 11, at 494.
181 See generally Mechele Dickerson, Vanishing Financial Freedom, 61 ALA. L. REV. 1079
(2010) (arguing that unfettered access to credit prevents people from exercising financial
freedom and imposes costs on people’s well-being).  For example, regulations may help
convince people who otherwise would remain unbanked or underbanked to use financial
products that ultimately will save them money. See MEHRSA BARADARAN, HOW THE OTHER
HALF BANKS: EXCLUSION, EXPLOITATION, AND THE THREAT TO DEMOCRACY 3, 122–26 (2015)
(detailing how the unbanked may spend up to 10% of their money to use their money, and
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example of how evidence-based regulation can enhance value and help con-
sumers.  The $11.9 billion per year that the CARD Act saves Americans once
was part of the sweatbox’s financial drain on families.182  What our data show
about the harms of prolonged time in the sweatbox is an important step in
quantifying the full range and extent of unmanageable debts’ harms.
Likewise, without these data, prevailing narratives based on faulty
assumptions resting on popular stereotypes about the people who file bank-
ruptcy set the structure of the Bankruptcy Code and affect how attorneys and
judges make decisions in individual cases.  Our bankruptcy laws currently are
designed to search out the rare instances of people who want an easy break
and block them from filing.  Instead, our bankruptcy laws should be con-
cerned about ensuring that families who have worked hard to try to pay their
debts and desperately need a break do not postpone filing because bank-
ruptcy is so expensive and time-consuming.  That is, our data show that the
bankruptcy system should be worried about the costs and externalities of too
many people not filing rather than the danger of too many people filing.
Updating narratives about who files bankruptcy is equally crucial to
ensuring that bankruptcy judges can make decisions in individual cases that
reflect reality.  Similarly, when bankruptcy attorneys have access to evidence
about the details behind people’s financial decline prior to bankruptcy, they
can better advocate for their clients.  The bankruptcy system only functions
effectively when attorneys, judges, and policymakers understand the reality of
the problems to be solved.
Describing people’s lives in the sweatbox is fundamental to understand-
ing how our consumer credit and bankruptcy systems interact.  This Article’s
results will move bankruptcy a considerable step forward in helping families
realize the promise of its fresh start.  And they will provide the foundation for
future research into why people spend an increasingly long time in the sweat-
box prior to filing, including the potential connection between debt collec-
tion and people’s use of bankruptcy.  Such research is essential to promoting
the evidence-based policies that will balance the harms and benefits of con-
sumer credit, and that will transform bankruptcy back into a system that truly
helps people regain their financial footing.
the costs of fringe lending that people who do not have access to mainstream banks often
must use).
182 See supra note 18.
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